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MILITARY HISTORY DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 79 signed to press 23 Nov 79 p 3

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences M. Alekseyev (Moscow):
"Defense of Doctoral Dissertations"]

[Text] The defense of doctoral dissertations took place last year in the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Each of them is making a specific contribution to the science of military history.

"The Scandinavian Strategic Beachhead in World War II"--this was the dissertation subject of Colonel A. M. Noskov. It disclosed the tendencies for the use of the Scandinavian countries by the imperialist powers which were revealed in the course of World War II and which have remained timely under contemporary conditions, revealed the most characteristic features of armed conflict under the specific conditions of the Far North and the Arctic which have not lost their significance even now, and pointed out the basic trends in bourgeois military historiography on Scandinavian problems. New propositions were advanced on the basis of a broad scientific source base which includes Soviet and foreign military-history literature and documents from three Soviet and four foreign archives after a thorough analysis of the sources by the competitor. Furthermore, he defined concretely and refined the available data on the economic potential of the Scandinavian countries, its use by Germany in the war years, and also the size, composition, and combat employment of the armed forces of the Reich, western allies, Denmark, Norway, and partially Finland.

A. M. Nosikov's dissertation is the first military-history work which makes a comprehensive study of the Scandinavian countries' strategic significance in Europe During World War II. It has not only theoretical value, but also especially practical value which permits determining the role and place of the Scandinavian countries in the policy of the imperialist powers and exposing NATO's aggressive anti-Soviet plans in a well-reasoned manner.

The doctoral dissertation of Colonel A. S. Savin, "Japanese Militarism in the Period of World War II" discloses and studies for the first time in

Soviet historiography the sources of the aggressiveness of Japanese imperialist militarism--an important factor which led to Japan's entry as one of the most aggressive forces in World War II. It also discloses the reasons which entailed the strengthening of the "monopoly of military force" in Japan on its eve and which explain the aggressive nature of Japanese military doctrine, draws a well-grounded conclusion concerning the existence of a military-industrial complex in the indicated country in the period of World War II--the alliance of the biggest monopolies which became rich on military production, and the necessity to introduce the concept of "militarism's material-technical base" into scientific circulation is proven.

The writer of the dissertation showed the basic features of Japanese militarism (the military clique became the main force of the fascist movement in the country on the eve of World War II while the army and navy possessed great independence in view of the orientation of each of these armed services on specific groups of monopolies). He drew the conclusion that Japan's militarism in the period of World War II was the basic type of militarism--fascist militarism which is a system of political, economic, and ideological means of the fascist state--of the terroristic dictatorship of the most reactionary and chauvinistic elements of imperialism.

The practical value of the dissertation consists of the fact that it lays the basis for a theoretical analysis of the regular laws of Japanese imperialistic militarism and permits a correct evaluation of the policy of contemporary militant circles of Japan and increasing the effectiveness of the struggle against bourgeois ideology.

Colonel R. G. Solov'yev defended his dissertation on the totality of published works on the subject, "The Armed Struggle to Achieve the Fundamental Turning Point in the Great Patriotic War." The writer made a comprehensive disclosure of the Soviet Union's decisive role and the titanic activity of the Communist Party in mobilizing all of the country's resources to win victory. He showed the scientific groundlessness of the attempts of bourgeois historiography to falsify the very concept of fundamental turning point in war and the events connected with it. The conclusions drawn and the generalizations on these important questions by the competitor bear an original nature and are of great scientific and practical interest.

The activity of the Soviet High Command at the turning-point stage of the war is thoroughly studied and the plans and decisions adopted by Headquarters, Supreme High Command and the command of fronts as well as the strategic problems in the armed struggle to achieve the fundamental turning point in the war are thoroughly analyzed. The competitor's work discloses convincingly the creative nature of Soviet military art and its superiority over the enemy's military art. A comprehensive analysis of the Wehrmacht's military operations on the Soviet-German front in 1943 is given based on vast documentary material for the first time in Soviet historiography and the process of developing the plans of the most important operations, decisions, and operations of the Hitlerite high command is traced in detail. It is proven scientifically that

fascist Germany considered the summer offensive of 1943 on the Soviet-German front to be decisive, and the conclusion that Operation "Citadel" was only the initial operation and that after its victorious conclusion a further broad offensive by the Wehrmacht was planned is substantiated. Thus, the work of the dissertation's writer opened a new direction in Soviet and foreign historiography.

The works of Colonel Sovol'yev analyzed the special features of fascist Germany's third offensive in the East and the reasons for its rapid failure and they investigated in detail the stages in the crisis of the Wehrmacht's strategic defense on the Soviet-German front as the most important part of the process of achieving the fundamental turning point in war.

On the basis of the experience of the Kursk battle, V. G. Solov'yev studied one of the most important problems of contemporary military art--the influence of the factor of strategic surprise on armed conflict. The tremendous significance which the Wehrmacht command attached to surprise in the offensive and the measures conducted for this purpose is shown and the reasons for their failures are disclosed. The author's service is the comprehensive substantiation of the thesis that the Soviet command succeeded in ensuring the attainment of strategic surprise twice in the course of the Kursk battle.

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WARSAW PACT: BASIS FOR FURTHER STRENGTHENING DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 79 signed to press 23 Nov 79 pp 3-9

[Article by Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of Warsaw Pact Nations Army Gen A. Gribkov: "Further Strengthening of Warsaw Pact Nations and the Combat Union of their Armies"]

[Text] In stating the increased influence of the socialist countries on the course of world events, the 25th CPSU Congress also pointed to the complexity and contradictory nature of the international situation. It noted that a number of big states are displaying an obvious reluctance to stop the arms race. The opponents of detente and disarmament are functioning actively, in various forms, and from various directions. Although imperialism's possibilities are now considerably curtailed in this regard, its nature remains unchanged. It is through the fault of the imperialists that conflicts and acute crisis situations capable of causing the conflagration of a new world war broke out repeatedly and are breaking out first in one, and then in another region of our planet. They are the counterrevolutionary actions in Hungary (1965), the attempt to strangle the Cuban socialist revolution (1961), the U.S. aggression against the Vietnamese people (1964), the attempt to eliminate the socialist system in Czechoslovakia (1968), and others. Altogether, the imperialists have initiated more than 100 local wars and armed conflicts since World War II.*

The forces of imperialism and reaction have stepped up their activity in recent years. They are striving to undermine detente and to throw mankind backward toward the times of the "cold War." Frantic propaganda of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism is being waged, all kinds of falsehoods about the so-called "Soviet military threat" are being spread, interference in the internal affairs of the socialist countries is being attempted, the meaning of detente is being distorted, and the handwheel of the arms race is being untwisted ever more rapidly.

Achieving a leading role in the international arena, the enemies of peace and socialism are combining their efforts, integrating the economic and

* "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 5, Voenizdat, 1978, p 21.

military power of the imperialist states, and are trying by any means to weaken the positions of the socialist system, suppress the national-liberation movement of peoples, prevent the expansion and deepening of the class struggle by the workers in the capitalist countries, and retard the irreversible process of capitalism's general crisis.

The aggressive NATO bloc--the organizer of subversive activity, espionage, ideological sabotage, carrier of the threat to export counterrevolution, and the center of preparations for new wars--continues to remain the tool of the "cold war." It is feverishly building up its armaments as it complicates the situation in Europe.

The next step in increasing the bloc's military potential is the 15-year program adopted by the Washington session of the NATO Council (1978). The program calls for further modernization and a considerable increase in the quantity of armaments in Europe. The U. S. Secretary of Defense, H. Brown, declared publicly that by the middle of the 1980's America will ensure the nuclear superiority of NATO over the Warsaw Pact states and that this would place at the disposal of the United States the "potential for guaranteed destruction."* Its accomplishment will require an additional 80 billion dollars. Since World War II, the United States alone has expended approximately 2 trillion dollars for military purposes. And it intends to expend another 1.5 trillion dollars in the next 10 years.**

The situation is also continuing to be aggravated in the East where a unique "quadrangle" is being formed in which the economic and military might of the United States and Western Europe is being supplemented by the industrial capabilities of Japan and China's tremendous human resources. The position of the Beijing leadership is converging more and more with the policy of imperialism.

A difficult situation remains in the Near East, Africa, and Latin America where the United States and the aggressive imperialist NATO bloc which it heads are striving to keep the peoples of these regions under their influence with the use of arms, economic and political pressure, threats, and blackmail.

The Pentagon has begun the creation of a "new quick reaction corps" with a strength of more than 100,000 men. It is intended that the radius of action of this interventionist gendarme corps will be extremely great.

And recently, the United States has initiated a noisy propaganda campaign around the far-fetched question of the stay of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Despite the admission of the American president, J. Carter, that they are not a large contingent, are not strike forces, and do not represent an immediate threat to the United States, the Pentagon meanwhile undertook

* PRAVDA, 25 October 1979

** MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', No 7, 1979, p 80.

a provocative demonstration of big naval forces near the shores of socialist Cuba. Washington has even decided to create a headquarters for a "Caribbean operational task force." This sabre-rattling is nothing but an attempt to heat up the atmosphere in the Caribbean basin.

Moving in the vanguard of imperialist reaction is Zionism whose basic content consists of militant chauvinism, racism, anticommunism, and anti-Sovietism. The danger of international Zionism is increasing with an expansion of the influence exerted by the Zionist bourgeoisie on ruling imperialist circles, especially in the United States, and the increased militaristic activity of Israel's leadership.

Thus, under the conditions which have developed the close political, economic, ideological, and military unity of the socialist countries has vitally importance significance for the defense of socialism's achievements. One of the forms of such unity is the Warsaw Pact Organization. Its creation was an objective necessity, a forced responsive measure to the active military preparations of the imperialists which are directed against the socialist commonwealth and toward the formation, expansion, and strengthening of the aggressive NATO military-political alliance which is threatening the peace and security of peoples.

Fraternal relations based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism have formed between the Warsaw Pact states. "...Our alliance, our friendship, and our collaboration," L. I. Brezhnev points out, "are the alliance, friendship, and collaboration of sovereign states which enjoy equal rights and are united by common goals and interests and the bonds of comradely solidarity and mutual assistance."*

The unity of the fraternal states was characterized by various forms of objective mutual ties at different stages. At first, it was formed as a military-political alliance based on bilateral ties. Later, the bilateral military-political relations of a number of countries were supplemented by the multilateral Warsaw Pact, and the economic relations--by CEMA. New forms of unity began to develop in the 1970's as a result of the expansion of political and ideological ties. Constantly being improved, these ties are becoming multiplanned and are acquiring ever greater depth. At the same time, the influence of our commonwealth on the course of modern history is increasing. The collective initiatives of the Warsaw Pact countries are directed toward the further strengthening of peace, confirmation of the principles of peaceful coexistence, and preventing the threat of a world nuclear war. The struggle to halt the arms race and for disarmament, stressed L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress, was and remains one of the main directions of our foreign-policy activity.**

* L. I. Brezhnev, "Aktual'nyye voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty KPSS" [Urgent Problems in Ideological Work of the CPSU], Vol 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p399.

** See "Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 22.

The Moscow (1978) conference of the Political Consultative Committee was confirmation of the firm devotion of the Warsaw Pact's member states to the policy of a relaxation of tension and their resolve to attain a deepening of this process. The declaration which was adopted pointed to the necessity to accomplish the most important task of international policy--the most rapid and decisive turning point in talks on halting the arms race, put forth the proposal to exclude all varieties of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of states, and stressed the special significance of questions concerning military detente and disarmament in Europe.

Great significance is had by the initiative of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact members, which was put forth at the conference in Budapest (1979), to conduct an all-European conference at the political level with the participation of all European states, the United States, and Canada at which there would be consideration of proposals directed toward slackening military opposition, lowering the concentration of armed forces, reducing armaments, and strengthening peace and security in Europe.

Another striking illustration of the profound devotion of the countries of the socialist commonwealth to the policy of peace and peaceful collaboration was the meetings and talks by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev with the leaders of a number of fraternal parties and states in the Crimea (1979). In the course of them, the actual directions of socialist foreign policy received telling confirmation: a consistent line to restrain and curtail the arms race, clear orientation toward the relaxation of international tension and toward supplementing political detente with military, and support of the rights of peoples to free and independent development.

"Impelled by the sincere desire to end the deadlock in the efforts of many years to attain military detente in Europe," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in Berlin at ceremonies concerning the 30th anniversary of the GDR, "and to serve as an example in the transition from words to actual deeds we, by agreement with the leadership of the GDR and after consultations with other member states of the Warsaw Pact, /adopted the decision to reduce unilaterally the number of Soviet troops in Central Europe. During the next 12 months, up to 20,000 Soviet servicemen, thousands of tanks, and a certain amount of other military equipment will be removed from the territory of the German Democratic Republic"/* [in boldface].

Despite the active resistance of reactionary forces and their accomplices, the process of curtailing the arms race which was begun on the initiative of the Soviet Union and other member states of the Warsaw Pact is leading to certain shifts. Thus, this year in Vienna L. I. Brezhnev and J. Carter signed an Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons and other important documents.

The Vienna meeting and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech in Berlin mark a new and significant step in improving the international political climate. The

* PRAVDA, 7 October 1979

complete realization of the documents signed in Vienna opens up new opportunities to halt the buildup of arsenals of nuclear missile weapons and to ensure their quantitative and qualitative limitation. The accomplishment of this most important task of contemporaneity will be furthered to a considerable extent by the further expansion and deepening of the fraternal countries' political collaboration. It is now being improved in various directions, the chief of which are: regulation of political interrelations of the socialist states on a basis treaties of friendship, collaboration, and mutual assistance and the coordination of foreign-policy actions along inter-governmental, party-state, and interparliamentary lines.

In analyzing the process of the drawing together of the socialist powers, the 25th Congress distinguished two aspects of this phenomenon: objective factors which facilitate it, and the purposeful activity of the socialist countries' communist and workers parties.

The comprehensive deepening of socialist economic integration is extremely instructive in this regard. Its improvement is accomplished, first of all, along the line of coordinating national-economic plans. This is the most important direction. Qualitatively new features in the coordination of plans consist of the direct linking of the realization of an integrated program with the national economic plans of the CEMA countries, the solution of major economic problems in collaboration on a bilateral and multilateral basis, the wider influence of coordinated plans on the sphere of material production, pricing policy, the introduction of a single system of standards, and so forth. Second, integration is proceeding along the path of the interstate division of labor and the specialization and cooperation in production. The accomplishment of this task is directed toward the joint development of natural resources for common use and the joint construction of big industrial complexes. Third, the combination of efforts of socialist collaboration is intensifying along the line of an increase in foreign-trade turnover. Mutual deliveries of commodities meet the requirements of the countries and contribute to their accomplishment of plans for economic development.

The countries of the socialist commonwealth are now a monolithic alliance with a dynamically developing economy. In 1951-1978 the rates of growth in the national income and industrial production of the CEMA countries were three times higher than among the developed capitalist states. And in 30 years their share in the world total for industrial production increased from 18 percent to approximately one third.*

At the 33d CEMA session in Moscow in June 1979, not only were the results of the path travelled by this organization in 30 years summed up, but a broad range of urgent problems in further mutual collaboration was also examined.

As long as such sources of military danger as imperialism and militant Chinese chauvinism exist, the military unity of the fraternal countries and the combat alliance of their armies acquire special significance and urgency.

* PRAVDA, 1 July 1979.

A world war, if it is unleashed by the enemies of peace and socialism, will be a coalition war, the opposition of the forces of socialism and imperialism on a global scale. This requires that the countries of the socialist commonwealth ensure military as well as political and economic unity and constantly strengthen it. The military alliance of the fraternal countries has passed through two stages in its development. The first encompasses the period from the end of the Great Patriotic War to the formation of the Warsaw Pact Organization (1945-1955). During these years, the task of creating national armies was basically accomplished in the countries which had set forth on the socialist path. The second, a qualitatively new stage, is characterized by the more active participation of each socialist power in the strengthening of the common defensive might.

The military unity of the Warsaw Pact member states is now being consolidated in such directions as: the coordination of plans for the development of national armed forces and increasing their combat readiness; the elaboration and introduction, into practice, of common principles and methods for training troops and staffs and the training and indoctrination of the personnel; mutual assistance in equipping the fraternal armies with new military equipment and weapons and in improving the system for training military cadres; the combination of efforts in the military-theoretical field and strengthening mutual relations of the political organs of national armies; the development of sports ties.

The forms and methods which are used in coordinating the plans for the building and development of the fraternal armies and the conduct of measures to improve the system of collective defense and the combat readiness of the troops and fleets are varied. The primary place among them is occupied by the coordination of efforts of state organs, national ministers of defense, general staffs of the allied armies, and the Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces. This permits the successful accomplishment of common defense missions with consideration of the capabilities of each of the Warsaw Pact member countries. The following are accomplished between the Warsaw Pact states and their armies: direct deliveries of types of combat equipment and weapons; the transfer of licenses; the exchange of military-technical literature and planning and operational-technical documentation; joint scientific-research and experimental-design work; scientific-technical consultations; standardization of combat equipment and weapons; and the organization of mutual assistance between specialists for the most rapid mastery of contemporary equipment and armament.

The forms of collaboration in the field of combat training, instruction, and indoctrination of troop and fleet personnel are varied. The Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces is working out plans for joint measures and their comprehensive support, generalizing the leading experience in training the troops and fleets, and developing recommendations for its practical use.

Joint measures are a special direction in military collaboration. They include, first of all, various exercises in the training of staffs and troops

which are conducted under the direction of the Combined Armed Forces Command and national commands, and drills, assemblies, and conferences of the fraternal armies' command personnel.

During the first years of activity of the Combined Armed Forces and the Combined Command, exercises at the tactical level were practiced more often, while later exercises on a larger scale have been conducted regularly.

The successes attained in the training of troops and the control elements and their technical equipping permitted the Combined Command to conduct even bigger, combined exercises--maneuvers involving units and large units of ground forces, air forces, air defense troops, and naval forces of the allied states.

Forms and methods for the tactical training of the troops received further improvement. Plans for the joint combat training of units and subunits which, after mutual examination and coordination between general staffs are implemented, are worked out on the basis of bilateral understandings between the defense ministers of the allied states. Plans provide for the conduct of tactical (tactical-special) exercises, drills, group lessons, conferences, joint camp assemblies, measures for the international indoctrination of the personnel of units and subunits of the allied armies, and also the mutual use of ranges, special training installations, and equipment.

Joint camp assemblies have substantial significance in expanding the forms of collaboration in the field of combat training of troops in national armies. Special programs which provide for the conduct of political lessons as well as lessons in tactical, firing, special, drill, and physical training and driving are worked out for the time of their conduct. Here, great attention is devoted to competitions of various types between the men of the allied armies, to the working out of standards, and to the exchange of experiences in the combat training of the personnel. The creative development of forms of training at assemblies permits the transition from training in national groups to training in mixed groups and, subsequently, to joint practical sub-unit lessons.

Important significance for the further strengthening of the fraternal armies' combat collaboration was acquired by military-scientific conferences conducted on timely questions of military theory, publications of collective works devoted to strengthening the friendship and brotherhood of the socialist armies, the exchange of lecturers, mutual visits of defense ministers and other military delegations, the presence of party and government leaders at exercises and maneuvers, the conduct of joint anniversary ceremonies, mass cultural measures, olympiads of friendly armies, and so forth.

A large role in the expansion and deepening of the military unity of countries in the socialist commonwealth is played by the military organs of the Warsaw Pact Organization which are harmonious international collectives united by a community of goals and ideals. Their activity, which is closely tied with the activity of national military organs, encompasses all directions

in the collaboration of the allied states in the military field and includes a broad range of questions connected with the development and improvement of the Combined Armed Forces and strengthening the defense of the allied countries.

The fundamental problems in strengthening the defensive capability of the socialist commonwealth and the development of the Combined Armed Forces are examined by the Political Consultative Committee (PKK)--the highest military-political organ of the Warsaw Pact member states. Its decisions on defense questions form the basis of activity by the Committee of the Ministers of Defense, the Combined Command, the Military Council, and other control organs of the Commander of the Combined Armed Forces.

The Committee of the Ministers of Defense of the Warsaw Pact member nations decides important questions in the strengthening of the allied states' defensive capability and the development and improvement of the Combined Armed Forces, and it directs the activity of the Warsaw Pact's military organs.

The Combined Command consistently implements the decisions of the Warsaw Pact member nations which are adopted at sessions of the PKK and Committee of Ministers for strengthening the combat collaboration of the allied armies and raising their combat ability and constant readiness to defend the achievements of socialism and defeat any aggressor. Important questions on the current activity of the Combined Command are resolved at sessions of the Military Council of the Combined Armed Forces.

The Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces--the main control organ of the Commander and the operating organ of the Committee of the Ministers of Defense--is occupied with questions of the life and activity of the troops and fleets. A large role belongs to it in the preparation and conduct of sessions of the Committee of the Ministers of Defense and the Military Council of the Combined Armed Forces and in the practical implementation of their decisions and recommendations.

The contemporary stage of military collaboration of the Warsaw Pact states is characterized by the further development of its bases and principles and by the deepening of content, forms, and methods. This process corresponds to those changes which are taking place in the economic, socio-political, and spiritual relations in the countries of the socialist commonwealth.

In struggling for peace, at the same time the communist and workers parties, governments, and peoples of the Warsaw Pact member states are forced constantly to be concerned about the further strengthening of the unity of countries in the socialist commonwealth and the combat alliance of their armies when faced by the imperialist danger. They must also increase revolutionary vigilance and tirelessly improve collective defense. And, as the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov warns, those "who rattle sabres must know that they can be seriously burned."*

* PRAVDA, 25 October 1979

The Combined Armed Forces now possess the latest armament and combat equipment. They are greeting the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact Organization with lofty attainments in combat and operational training and are always ready to accomplish their patriotic and international duty--to defend the great revolutionary achievements of the fraternal peoples who are the builders of socialism and communism.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: BATTLE OF SMOLENSK

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 79 signed to press 23 Nov 79 pp 10-14

[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War," by Lt Col V. Shevchuk: "Actions of Operational Troop Groupings in the Smolensk Battle (10 July-10 September 1941)"]

[Text] In the second half of July 1941, the armies of the Western Front continued a fighting withdrawal under the blows of superior enemy forces. The Hitlerites captured the cities of Velizh, Demidov, Dukhovshchina, and Pochinok (see figure). By the end of the month, our troops had abandoned Smolensk and Yel'nya. Large units and units of the 20th and 16th Armies (commanders Lieutenant Generals P. A. Kurochkin and M. F. Lukin) were fighting while encircled in the area northeast of Smolensk.

The reserves of the front and reinforcements approaching from the country's depth entered the battle as virtually uncoordinated groupings as they tried to stop the enemy who had penetrated onto our territory and to create conditions for his destruction.

On 20 July, J. V. Stalin pointed to the negative consequences of splitting up the forces in a conversation over the direct line with the commander of the Western Direction, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, and he expressed the following observations: "Isn't it time to abandon such tactics and begin to create concentrated forces of seven or eight divisions with cavalry on the flanks? Select the direction and force the enemy to reorganize his ranks in accordance with our command's will. Here, for example, why can't we take three divisions from Khomenko, three Orel divisions, one tank division.. and add, perhaps two or three divisions from the reserve army, add cavalry here, and aim this entire group at the Smolensk area to smash and kick the enemy out of this area, driving him beyond the Orsha...."¹

On this same day, the Chief of the General Staff issued a directive on the conduct of an operation to encircle and destroy the Hitlerites in the Smolensk area. It also contained requirements expressed by the Supreme Commander concerning the concentration of efforts on the most important directions.²

In executing the orders of the Headquarters, Supreme High Command (Hq SHC), Marshal S. K. Timoshenko decided to launch a counteroffensive with the troops of specially created operational groups of forces which had been made available from the personnel of the 29th, 30th, 24th, and 28th Armies, launching simultaneous strikes from the areas of Belyy, Yartsevo, and Roslavl' in the direction of Smolensk and, in coordination with the 20th and 16th Armies, to destroy the enemy forces north and south of Smolensk. To assist the troops attacking from the front, a cavalry group was created (two divisions) with the mission to execute a raid against the rear areas of the enemy's Mogilev-Smolensk force.³


The group of Major General V. A. Khomenko with forces of three rifle divisions⁴ received the mission to launch a strike on 23 July from the area of the city of Belyy in the direction of Dukhovshchina and no later than 25 July, in conjunction with the troops of the groups commanded by Lieutenant General S. A. Kalinin (three rifle divisions) and Major General K. K. Rokossovskiy (one rifle and two tank divisions) attacking from the direction of Yartsevo, to encircle and destroy in the area of Dukhovshchina the enemy who had three tank divisions and one tank brigade there. Attacking in the general direction of Demidov, the cavalry group supported the actions of the main body from the north. Subsequently, the troops of the groups were to advance directly on Smolensk and make contact with the 20th and 16th Armies.

The troops of Lieutenant General V. Ya. Kachalov's group (two rifle and one tank divisions) received the mission to launch an attack on 22 July from the area of Roslavl' along the highway going to Smolensk, destroy the opposing enemy, and on the second day to reach the Pochinok-Khislavichi line; subsequently, it was to develop the attack on Smolensk, repelling enemy strikes from the west. The group of Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov (three rifle divisions)⁵ was to prevent the advance of German-fascist troops on the Toropets direction by means of active operations.⁶

The counteroffensive of the operational groups was supported from the air by the aviation of the Western Front which, at that time, numbered 276 airplanes (189 bombers and 87 fighters).⁷

Two days remained for the preparation of combat operations. This time proved to be sufficient only for the adoption of a decision and the assignment of the mission to the troops which were operating in various areas. Organization to the full extent of coordination within the groups and with the 20th and 16th Armies as well as of support of the troops' combat actions could not be completed. Moreover, some large units which were part of the groups were unable to reach the departure areas in time. Due to the strong influence of enemy aviation, they suffered large losses in men and materiel even before the start of the attack. As a result, the simultaneous launching of the counteroffensive by all large units of the operational groups on the morning of 23 July did not take place. This weakened the strength of the initial strike considerably. Moreover, the troops operated in wide zones and their low strength did not permit the attainment of superiority in men and equipment on directions of the main efforts.

Missions of Operational Groups in the Battle of Smolensk



After 24 July all operational groups were already attacking. Overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, they advanced slowly. As indicated by the commander of the 3d Tank Group, General G. Got [as transliterated], all units and large units of his group, including the training brigade, were drawn

into the battle to repel the attack of the Soviet troops.⁸ The large units of the Western Front launched telling blows against the opposing Hitlerite force, deprived it of freedom of maneuver, and forced it to spread out along the front and assume the defensive on a number of sectors.

During 26-27 July, the troops of the operational groups continued the attack. The enemy began to transfer men and equipment to Smolensk from unattacked sectors of the front. Some of them fell under the blow of our cavalry divisions which were operating on the flanks and in the enemy rear area, disrupted his lines of communications, and disorganized the delivery of ammunition and fuels and lubricants, thereby contributing to the offensive by the operational groups.⁹

Direct leadership of the operational groups was assigned to the commander of the Western Front, Lieutenant General A. I. Yeremenko. Making an estimate of the situation, in particular, of the results of the five-day offensive, on 27 July he detailed missions to the groups and required a decisive advance for the final destruction of the enemy in the area of Dukhovshchina. About five hours were allotted for preparation for the offensive. Missions were assigned and defined in detail for the large units and, in a number of cases for units, primarily on a map.

One of the special features of the newly initiated combat operations was the fact that quite frequently they bore a meeting nature. For example, on 27 July in the vicinity of the crossing on the Dnepr at Solov'yevo some of the forces in the group of General K. K. Rokossovskiy and the 108th Rifle Division, XLIV Rifle Corps (division commander Colonel P. V. Mironov) which had arrived by the end of the day and which had been brought up from the front reserve successfully repelled the attack of a large enemy tank column which had attempted to seize a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river. Further Hitlerite attempts to attain success at the crossing were defeated. On that same day, the commander of the Western Direction placed the XLIV Rifle Corps (commander Major General V. A. Yushkevich) under the command of General K. K. Rokossovskiy.¹⁰

On 28 July, General K. K. Rokossovskiy's group attacked the enemy, trying to dislodge him from the positions which he occupied. Strikes by enemy aviation which had air superiority and counterattacks by enemy tanks and motorized infantry slowed up the advance. The group's large units and units suffered considerable losses, and the enemy intensified his resistance more and more by means of units which had arrived from other sectors of the front.

Intense battles were also waged by the group of General V. A. Khomenko. Smashing enemy resistance, it began to advance to the southwest. During this day, the troops of General S. A. Kalinin's group advanced 1-1.5 kilometers while those of General V. Ya. Kachalov captured an enemy center of resistance in the area of Koski. On 28 July, the divisions of General I. I. Maslennikov prepared for an attack on Il'ino.

Thus, during 28 and 29 July tangible losses were inflicted on the enemy and his advance was stopped on a number of sectors of the front, but the necessary conditions for the complete destruction of the Dukhovshchina force could not be created.¹¹

The slow advance of the operational groups, as Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko stressed in his report to the Chief of the General Staff on 3 August, is explained primarily by the weak air support of the attacking troops, the great shortage of tanks and artillery in the large units, and the extremely limited time to prepare the counteroffensive.

The commander of the Western Direction reported to Hq SHC the measures which were conducted on his orders. In particular, he said: "I collected and sent everything within my power to reinforce Khomenko and Kalinin. But, you know, I had no cannon, no airplanes, and very few people."¹²

At the same time, in individual cases the slow advance of the operational groups is explained by poor troop control on the part of commanders and staffs. Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, for example, expressed dissatisfaction with the disorganized nature of leadership on the part of General V. Ya. Kachalov. On the results of the offensive by all operational groups as a whole, the commander drew the following conclusion: "I believe that we completely deranged the enemy's offensive with the battles of these days. The seven or eight tank and motorized divisions and the two or three infantry divisions operating against us were deprived of offensive capabilities for full dozens of days by tremendous losses."¹³

On 4 August, missions were defined in detail by Hq SHC for all operational groups. By means of active offensive operations, they were to attract as many as possible of the enemy forces.

In executing the order of Hq SHC, the operational groups continued to launch strikes on the enemy, which weakened even more the German force on the Smolensk direction, but our troops also suffered large losses. On 10 September, on order of Hq SHC the troops of the Western Front assumed the defensive on the occupied positions.

Thus, the active operations of the operational groups rendered significant assistance to the front as a whole, and especially to the 20th and 16th Armies, contributing to their breakout of encirclement, and they also had a beneficial influence on stabilizing the situations of adjacent units.

However, the assigned missions could not be completely accomplished in the course of the counteroffensive. The basic reasons for this were a shortage of men and equipment in the operational groups and poor air support of the offensive. The circumstance that complete coordination was not attained between the attacking operational groups as well as between them and the 20th and 16th Armies also had a disadvantageous effect. The creation of the groups was accomplished in extremely short times and their composition included troops on the concentration of which much time was spent. Furthermore,

the movement of large units and units up to the departure areas for the attack took place under conditions of enemy air superiority.

It must be noted that in questions of the leadership of the troops in the operational groups a tremendous role was played by their staffs. In those places where the staff of one or another large unit which stepped forth as the group commander's control element accomplished its functions successfully and the available means of communication ensured clear control, as a rule those groups operated in a more coordinated manner and their results were significant.

It can be said that under the conditions in the situation of the summer of 1941, the employment of operational groups justified itself. In essence, it was the only possibility for the accomplishment of an active offensive mission in the course of the strategic defense on the Smolensk direction. The experience in the employment of operational groups of forces which was obtained in the Battle of Smolensk was subsequently studied and used in subsequent operations. Nor has it lost its significance for today.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense USSR], fund 96-A, inventory 2011, file 5, sheets 1-2.
2. Ibid, fund 48-A, inventory 1554, file 91, sheets 60-61.
3. Ibid, fund 208, inventory 2454, file 2, sheet 631; fund 48-A, inventory 1554, file 91, sheets 60-61.
4. Ibid, fund 208, inventory 2511, file 20, sheets 336, 337.
5. Division commanders of the cavalry group: 50th Cavalry Division (kd)--Colonel I. A. Pliyev, 53d kd--Brigade Commander M. S. Mel'nik; group of Major General V. A. Khomenko: 242d Rifle Division (sd)--Major General K. A. Kovalenko, 250th sd--Major General I. S. Gorbachev, and 251st sd--Major General F. Ya. Solov'yev; group of Lieutenant General S. A. Kalinin: 89th sd--Colonel T. F. Kolesnikov, 91st sd--Major General N. F. Lebedenko, and 166th sd--Colonel A. N. Kholzinev; group of Major General K. K. Rokossovskiy: 38th sd--Colonel M. G. Kirillov, 101st Tank Division (td)--Colonel G. M. Mikhaylov and 107th td--Colonel P. N. Domrachev; group of Major General V. Ya. Kachalov: 145th sd--Major General A. A. Volkhin, 149th sd--Major General F. D. Zakharov, and 104th td--Colonel V. G. Burkov; group of Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov: 243d sd--Major General F. N. Parkhomenko, 252d sd--Colonel A. A. Zabaluyev, and 256th sd--Major General S. A. Ivanov. (Editor's note).
6. TsAMO, fund 208, inventory 2511, file 20, sheets 337-338; combat composition of groups presented according to verified data.
7. Ibid, inventory 2454, file 31, sheet 141.

8. G. Got [as transliterated], "Tankovyye operatsii" [Tank Operations]. Translated from the German, Voenizdat, 1961, p 118.
9. TsAMO, fund 246, inventory 1525, file 1, sheet 78.
10. Ibid, fund 246, inventory 1525, file 6, sheet 38.
11. Ibid, sheet 31.
12. Ibid, file 1, sheet 182.
13. Ibid, fund 246, inventory 1525, file 1, sheet 183.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: CONTROL OF AIRBORNE LANDINGS

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[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War," by Col (Ret) Ya. Samoylenko: "From the Experience of Controlling Airborne Landings During the War"]

[Text] The basic principles for the combat employment of airborne landings, to include questions on the organization and implementation of their control, were worked out prior to the Great Patriotic War and consolidated in a number of guidance documents. In particular, we should include among them the Temporary Field Regulation of the Red Army of 1936, the 1940 Field Regulation of the Red Army, and the draft 1941 Field Regulation of the Red Army.

Thus, it is stressed in the 1941 draft Field Regulation that the use of airborne landings requires: the organization of thorough reconnaissance of the drop (landing) zones and the operations of the assault force; secrecy and surprise in employment; reliable support of the airborne force's transportation and its subsequent ground operations by combat aviation; strict calculation of the time which the force needs to prepare for the operation and accomplish the combat mission; and the organization of reliable communications with the assault force which has been dropped.¹

Prior to the publication of this regulation, it was believed that the leadership of airborne large units and units and the planning of their combat employment should be accomplished by the commander and staff of the front of which they are a part. This reduced somewhat the effectiveness of employing airborne troops (VDV) in case of an outbreak of armed conflict. Therefore, prior to the start of the war with fascist Germany and during its first months a number of measures were adopted which were directed toward increasing centralization of the leadership of airborne troops. In June 1941, the Soviet Army Airborne Troop Directorate was created which, in August of the same year, was converted into the Directorate of the Commander of Airborne Troops. An order of the Peoples Commissar of Defense at the beginning of September 1941 established the post of commander of airborne troops. Major General V. A. Glazunov was appointed to this post. All VDV large units and

units were removed from subordination to the fronts and transferred to the direct subordination of the VDV commander.²

New views on the employment of airborne landings found reflection in the Regulation on the VDV and the Manual on the Combat Employment of Airborne Troops of the Red Army which were published in 1941. These documents pointed out that the VDV are a tool of the Supreme High Command. For the accomplishment of missions in the enemy's rear, by decision of the Headquarters, Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] individual VDV large units and units could be resubordinated to the front commanders or used in a centralized manner under the direct command of the VDV commander.³ These regulations formed the basis for the activity of commanders and staffs of all echelons in the course of organizing the control of airborne landings. Specific forms and methods of control by the latter depended on the goals and missions of the front operation in the interests of which the airborne landing was employed; the missions of the airborne force itself; its composition; the situation in the area of forthcoming combat operations; and the time allotted to prepare the landing force for combat operations.

In order to have a clearer impression of the essence of control of airborne landings in the war years⁴, let us examine its basic problems primarily on the basis of the experience of the Vyaz'ma and Dneprovsk airborne operations.

The decision to employ operational airborne landings was made by the Hq SHC. Thus, it made the decision to conduct the Vyaz'ma airborne operation in January 1942. The mission was assigned to the VDV commander, Major General V. A. Glazunov, who was summoned to Hq SHC together with the VDV chief of staff, Major General of Aviation P. P. Ionov and the Air Force commander, Lieutenant General of Aviation P. F. Zhigarev, on 15 January.

The following were indicated to him: the goal of the airborne operation, the composition of the airborne force, the departure area for the drop and the readiness time for the drop. Accomplishment of the mission was assigned to the IV Airborne Corps which was transferred to operational subordination of the Western Front commander. The plan for the airborne operation was worked out jointly by the staffs of the airborne and air forces by the end of 16 January.⁵ The following were indicated in the plan: the goal, concept, and stages of the operation; the composition of the airborne landing force, its strength, and armament; the composition of the aviation to be used to lift the force to the enemy rear area, cover it in the departure area for the drop and in flight, and support it in the course of the battle in the enemy rear area; measures for the preparation and conduct of the operation, their times, and executors; and questions in the organization of control posts and communications as well as material-technical, medical, and rear area support. The document was signed by the commander, member of the military council, and chief of staff of the VDV and approved by the commander of the Western Front.

The staff of the airborne assault force in turn worked out the drop plan together with the commander of the air transport group. The corps command worked out the plan for dropping reconnaissance-sabotage groups. Warning orders for combat were issued at the same time.

Among the shortcomings in planning the Vyaz'ma airborne operation we should include the fact that the staff of the Western Front, in whose interests the airborne landing was employed, did not take a direct part in it. As a result, questions concerning the conduct of combat operations by units of the assault force and its coordination with troops of the front did not find proper reflection in the plan for the operation and were resolved in a general form since the VDV staff did not have available complete data on the situation in the Western Front's zone of attack. It was intended to begin the operation on 21 January 1942.

On 17 January the VDV commander, Major General V. A. Glazunov, issued an oral combat order to the commander of the IV Airborne Corps, Colonel A. F. Levashev, for the assembly of the 8th, 9th, and 214th Airborne Brigades of the large unit in the area of Kaluga in readiness to drop in the enemy rear on 21 January. However, this time proved to be unrealistic. Because the railroad bridge across the Oka in the vicinity of the city of Aleksin which had been destroyed by the fascists had not been completely restored, the corps could not completely assemble in the departure area for the drop by the indicated date or, what is more, prepare for it. Therefore, the start of the operation was shifted to the evening of 27 January.

On 24 January, the commander of the IV Airborne Corps received an order from the commander of the Western Front, Army General G. K. Zhukov, which stated: "Comrade Levashev. Mission: land the corps 26-27 January and occupy positions in accordance with the map. Goal--to cut the enemy's withdrawal to the west."⁶ Proceeding from the assigned mission and the situation which had developed on the front the corps commander, Major General A. F. Levashev, made his decision at 1800 hours on 26 January. Its essence was reduced to the following: exploiting the surprise of the drop, to cut enemy communications between Vyaz'ma and Dorogobyzh and prevent the approach of enemy reserves from the west and the withdrawal of his units to the west.

The combat mission was given to the subunit commanders a day prior to loading in the airplanes. The personnel were acquainted with it in the departure area for the drop. Specially prepared models of the terrain of the forthcoming operations were used here. Subunit commanders saw to it that each paratrooper had a deep understanding of his mission and the mission of his subunit, firmly knew how he must operate in case of landing in a direction away from the planned area, and learned by heart the names of the populated places, typical reference points, and their relative disposition on the ground. In the corps-brigade echelon, all questions connected with the landing were coordinated with the staff of the transport aviation prior to the start of the drop.

Preparations for the Dneprovsk airborne operation were conducted to approximately the same extent and in the same sequence.⁷ The decision for its conduct was made by Hq SHC on 17 September 1943. The assault force was assigned the mission to seize a bridgehead on the western bank of the Dnepr in the Bukrino bend and prevent the approach of enemy reserves from the west and southwest prior to the arrival of troops of the Voronezh Front in this area. The 1st, 3d and 5th (part of the forces) Airborne Brigades, which had been formed into an airborne corps, were allocated for its accomplishment from the forces of the VDV and placed under the command of the commander of the Voronezh Front. The deputy commander of airborne troops, Major General I. I. Zatevakhin, was appointed commander of the newly created large unit. The corps headquarters was formed from personnel of the VDV staff (neither the commander nor the staff landed in the enemy rear).

The plan for the operation was worked out by the VDV command and the staff of the Voronezh Front even prior to the assembly of the troops in the departure area for the drop. Questions of the assault force's coordination with the attacking rifle divisions, front artillery, and aviation were reflected in it in sufficient detail, thoroughly, and specifically with consideration of the experience of the Vyaz'ma landing operation. In particular, it was planned to drop artillery forward observers with the assault force and to detail squadrons of artillery spotter aircraft to control the artillery fire of the breakthrough corps which supported the assault force. It was intended to send an operations group from the supporting aviation to the commander of the airborne landing.

A large section of the plan was devoted to air support--aerial reconnaissance, air preparation of the drop zone prior to the dropping of the paratroopers, fighter cover and support of the airborne assault force's combat operations. Air support of the drop and the assault force's combat operations was accomplished by the 2d Air Army commanded by Colonel General of Aviation S. A. Krakovskiy. Direction of air support was assigned to the chief of staff of the Soviet Army's Air Force.

The plan contained detailed instructions on organizing the air defense of the departure area for the drop, coordination with partisans, secret control, and operational cover and deception. Appended to the plan for the airborne operation was a planning table for the drop which was signed by the VDV commander and the front chief of staff. In turn, brigade commanders and staffs worked out jointly with the commander of the transport air group tables for the dropping of the brigades which were then approved by the VDV commander. On 19 September 1943, the representative of Hq SHC, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, approved the operations plan after making a number of substantial comments.

In accordance with this document, the start of the drop was planned for the night of 24 September. Missions were assigned to the assault force by the commander of the Voronezh Front, Army General N. F. Vatutin. It was planned to conduct the assembly of men and equipment detailed for the airborne operation in the departure area for the drop (Lebedin, Smorodino, Bogodukhov) from

17 through 21 September; however, it was completed three days later because of the heavy load on the railroads.

In the middle of 23 September General N. P. Vatutin, who was at the command post of the 40th Army, detailed the missions for the airborne brigades through the commander of the VDV. The brigade commanders made their decisions for the drop and combat operations and announced them only on the following day, an hour and a half before the personnel embarked on the airplanes. As a result, the battalion and company commanders had very little time remaining to make the missions known to their subordinates. Platoon leaders were forced to assign the missions to their personnel in flight while battalion and company commanders did not have the opportunity to define in detail questions of coordination within the assault force and with the other combat arms or to contemplate the plan of battle after landing. Actually, they were restricted only by instructions on the drop zones, assembly after landing, and the position which was to be seized and defended. No preflight lessons with officers or with the personnel were conducted, either. Unquestionably, all this, as the course of the operation showed, had an adverse effect on the actions of the subunits in the enemy rear area.

Thus, in preparing an airborne landing commanders at all echelons must have available sufficient time to size up the missions, make an estimate of the situation, adopt a decision, assign combat missions to their personnel, and organize coordination.

One of the important factors in the control of an airborne assault force was the determination of the most advantageous time for the drop. In fact, from the moment that the decision is made to employ the landing until the start of its practical accomplishment the operational situation in the drop area may change substantially. Therefore, it was necessary constantly to have reliable data about the enemy in the drop area and to know the true situation of the friendly troops which are accomplishing a common mission with the assault force. In the case where the time for the drop was improperly selected because of an incorrect estimate of the situation, the airborne force did not accomplish its assigned missions completely. For example, in the Dneprovsk airborne operation, by the start of the drop big enemy forces had entered the area which was intended for it. Therefore, the necessity for an airborne landing to prevent the approach of enemy reserves to the Dnepr, as envisaged by the operation plan, virtually disappeared.

From what has been stated, it is evident that an important role belongs to reconnaissance in the course of planning an airborne operation. The VDV command and staff tried to make maximum use of data obtained from partisans, aerial reconnaissance, and the intelligence directorate of the front staff. They assigned two missions to reconnaissance. The first of them consisted of a thorough study of the nature of the terrain to determine the most advantageous routes for moving out to the objectives to be captured and for organizing the defense in case of enemy counterattacks. The second was the disclosure of the enemy force and the timely consideration of changes in the operational situation in the drop zone and close to it. This gave the

commander and staff of the airborne assault force the opportunity to make a correct determination of the composition and time of the drop, the structure of the assault force's combat formation, and to assign the combat missions to units and subunits. After the airborne force landed, reconnaissance was conducted by its own men and equipment.

One of the important tasks in the control of an airborne landing was the direction of its airlift to the enemy's rear area. Its successful accomplishment depended not only on the ability of the commanders, but also on a number of other factors, and namely: the secrecy in the assembly of the assault force in the departure area for the drop and its covering, the amount of aviation allocated, the skill of the flight personnel, the duration of the flights, consideration of weather conditions, and so forth.

Experience has shown that when lifting an airborne assault force it is necessary to create at least two control groups from the large unit command element and staff officers and to transport them in aircraft of different brigade echelons. Important significance was had by the well-thought-out distribution of radio equipment among the airplanes. Otherwise, the effectiveness of troop control after landing was sharply reduced. For example, in the Dneprovsk operation the commander of the 3d Airborne Brigade, in taking off on one of the airplanes with his chief of staff, did not take along one long-range radio while there were from three to six radios with radio operators on each of the other aircraft.⁶ Naturally, in this case there could be no talk of any effective control.

In planning the employment of airborne landings, great attention was devoted to the establishment and disposition of control posts and the organization of communications. Usually, a command post (CP) for the commander of the airborne troops and a system of command posts in the airborne assault force were created. In the Vyaz'ma airborne operation the commander's CP was deployed in the departure area for the drop (180 kilometers from the assault force's area of combat operations) jointly with the command post of the commander of the air-transport group. A group of generals and officers from the VDV staff was located at it in addition to the commander. The communication center of the CP's of the VDV and air-transport group commanders provided wire communications with the General Staff, with the VDV staff, with the commander and staff of the airborne assault force, and with the airfields from which the airlift of the force to the enemy rear area was accomplished. At these airfields, officers from the staff of the VDV were located at the CP's of the air unit commanders. Wire communications were backed up by radio.

In the departure area, the command post of the assault force commander was located close to the CP of the VDV commander, and the CP's of the airborne brigade commanders were deployed at the airfields from which they made the assault landing. The command posts of the brigade commanders were colocated with those of the air commanders.

The radio center of the VDV headquarters (RAF and RUK radios and four receivers) were also located here, in the departure area, for communication

with the headquarters of the airborne assault force and its brigades after their landing in the enemy rear. In addition, radio signals and radiograms which arrived from the VDV units could also be received at the communication centers of the Western Front and the Air Force in Moscow.

The encoding of maps, the call signs of the command personnel, and other documents for secret control were provided by the VDV staff to the headquarters of the airborne assault force in the departure area for the drop. Copies of all these documents were also sent to the headquarters of the Western Front.

The composition of the CP's at all echelons was drawn up in the course of the operation's preparation. The assault force's command post usually jumped into the enemy rear area as part of the assault's main body. Its personnel, divided into two or three groups, and communications equipment were distributed among several airplanes. Here, the groups were manned with consideration of the fact that each one was capable of assuming control.

In the course of the airborne assault, the control of the airborne landings in the Vyaz'ma^{9a} and Dneprovsk airborne operations was executed from the command post of the VDV commander. Checking the readiness of the subunits and units for embarking in the airplanes and their arrival at the airplanes in time, the VDV staff officers kept a record of the number and time of take-offs and, jointly with the air commanders, made the necessary corrections to the landing plan.

Communication with the airplanes during the airborne assault was maintained through the airfield radios. A signal table was worked up for communication between the assault force and the aviation. These signals were given during the day using conventional signs which were laid out with panels, and at night--by means of flares and bonfires.

Overall direction of the operation's course was accomplished by the front commander. The basic means of communication between the front headquarters and the assault force were radio and aircraft. Thus, for example, in the Vyaz'ma airborne operation there were three communication channels between the staff and the assault force. The front staff maintained communication with the headquarters of the IV Airborne Corps over a RAF-type radio (the corps had a "Sever" radio). The VDV headquarters radio center, which was located in the departure area for the drop, in turn relayed radio messages received from the assault force to the headquarters of the Western Front by telegraph. This increased the reliability of communication between the assault force and the front headquarters and VDV commander.

In addition to direct communications with the headquarters of the IV Airborne Corps, the staff of the Western Front also had direct communications with the headquarters of all airborne brigades in the corps. When one radio channel ceased operation, the others continued to function.

Within the airborne assault force the basic means of communication in battle also was radio down to battalion and separate detachments inclusively. Along with this, wide use was also made of wire communications, liaison officers, messengers, and personal contact between commanders and subordinates. The staff of the airborne assault force had communication with the brigades over two radio nets. In the Viaz'ma airborne operation, the coordination radio net included the army radios of the Western Front in whose zone of attack the area of the assault force's combat operations was located.

The corps commander accomplished control of the large units and units during the attack from the command post which was usually colocated with the corps reserve, as close as possible (4-5 kilometers) to the units which were attacking on the main sector.

When the assault force was conducting defensive battle, the CP of the airborne corps commander was located closer to the center of the defense area, also jointly with the reserves. Its distance from the FEBA [forward edge of the battle area] of the overall defense area fluctuated within limits of from 2 to 5-6 kilometers. In the defense as well as in the course of the attack, the CP's of the airborne brigades were located at a distance of 1-3 kilometers from their units which were conducting combat operations.

The command posts received poor engineer improvements. But great attention was paid to their camouflage and protection because the enemy always tried to disclose the locations of the assault force's control posts with the goal of their destruction. This forced the assault force's command and its individual large units to displace the CP's frequently. Thus, during the period of combat operations in the rear area the command posts of the IV Airborne Corps and the 9th Airborne Brigade changed their locations 10 times, and of the 214th Airborne Brigade--8 times.

On the whole, in the course of combat operations the communications of the IV Airborne Corps in the enemy rear area were stable and the control of it was firm and continuous. The signal officer of the Western Front, General N. D. Psurtsev, reported in one telegram addressed to the commander of the airborne landing: "Reporting to Comrade Zhukov on the state of communications with you, I evaluated them as excellent for these conditions. The commander ordered that the best commanders and radio operators be put in for government awards."⁹

An important role in the creation of all conditions for the effective accomplishment of tasks in the control of airborne assault forces was had by party-political work which was conducted constantly and purposefully during the preparation as well as in the course of airborne operations. It was namely during the war years that many traditions, firm and sanctified by blood, arose among the paratroopers and, first of all, the traditions of loyalty and devotion to the Soviet motherland and their military duty.

Thus, in the years of the Great Patriotic War the typical features in the control of airborne landings were centralized control, organization of

thorough planning of all stages of the airborne operation, reliable communications between the assault force and higher headquarters, and its close coordination with the attacking rifle divisions, aviation, and artillery. Experience has shown that important significance for the effective control of an airborne landing is also had by the organization and conduct of reconnaissance of the enemy, the correct selection of the departure area for the drop and the drop zone, the timely arrival of troops and equipment at the departure area for the drop, and the presentation of the combat mission to commanders and personnel.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Polevoy Ustav Krasnoy Armii" [Field Regulation of the Red Army] (Draft). Voenizdat, 1941, pp 18-19.
2. "50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR" [Fifty Years of the Soviet Armed Forces]. Voenizdat, 1968, pp 238, 268.
3. "Rukovodstvo po boyevomu primeneniyu vozdushno-desantnykh voysk Krasnoy Armii" [Manual on the Combat Employment of Airborne Forces of the Red Army]. Voenizdat, 1941, p 3.
4. During the years of the war, the Soviet command employed more than 50 airborne landings of various composition and purpose.
5. I. L. Lisov, "Desantniki (Vozdushnyye desanty)" [Paratroopers (Airborne Landings)]. Voenizdat, 1968, p 96.
6. Ibid, p 97.
7. See "Sovetskaya Voennoye Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 3. Voenizdat, 1977, pp 206-207.
8. G. P. Sofronov, "Vozdushnyye desanty vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne. Kratkiy voyenno-istoricheskiy ocherk" [Airborne Landings in World War II. A Brief Military-Historical Survey]. Voenizdat, 1962, p 32.
- 8a. During the flight to the drop zone, the airplane of General A. F. Levashev was shot down and command of the IV Airborne Corps was assigned to the chief of staff, Colonel A. F. Kazankin.
9. TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, fund of the Western Front], 1942, file No 5-a, p 50.

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WARTIME COMBAT MATERIEL: SUPPLY AND EFFECTIVENESS

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[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War," by Candidate of Historical Sciences and Senior Scientist V. Klevtsov: "Supplying the Soviet Army and Navy with Combat Materiel in the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] The Communist Party always attached tremendous significance to questions concerning the technical equipping of the Soviet Armed Forces as the most important factor in increasing their combat might and strengthening the defensive capability of the country as a whole. At one time, V. I. Lenin noted that communists never doubted "the tremendous importance of military equipment...as weapons which are used by the popular masses and classes of people for the resolution of great historic conflicts."¹

On the eve and with the start of World War II, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government adopted a number of operational measures directed toward the most complete utilization of the socialist economy's advantages in ensuring the reliable defense of the Soviet state. It was necessary to raise the technical level of the Soviet Army to a new stage in the shortest time and to create and outfit the troops with improved models of combat equipment and weapons. By the end of June 1941, new types of automatic rifles, large-caliber machineguns, powerful systems of tube and rocket artillery, the best heavy tank in the world, the KV, and the medium T-34 tank, the Yak-1, MiG-3, and LAGG-3 fighters which were the equal of world standards, the IL-2 attack aircraft, and the PYe-2 bomber had been developed.

By the start of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Army had received the first lots of new models of weapons and combat equipment: machineguns of various types--105,000, PPSH automatic rifles--100,000, guns and mortars of all calibers--82,000, tanks--1,861, airplanes--2,739, and others.²

Thus, by the start of the war the Soviet defense industry, based on the powerful heavy industry, increased the rates of production of new types of weapons and combat equipment. However, the technical reequipping of the Armed Forces could not be fully completed.

The technical equipping of the Soviet Army and Navy in the first period of the Great Patriotic War was accomplished in the course of difficult defensive battles. The Soviet economy basically had displaced its productive capacities to the east and had been reorganized on a war footing.

Despite the loss of the most important economic regions, the Soviet people were able to restore lost capacities of the war industry by the autumn of 1942 under the leadership of the Communist Party. The active army received weapons and combat equipment in ever-increasing amounts and, first of all, their basic types: artillery, tanks, and airplanes. From December 1941 through November 1942, the quantity of the most important combat materiel was: for guns and mortars--from 21,983,000 [sic] to 72,505 units, for tanks and SAU's [self-propelled artillery mounts]--from 1,731 to 6,014, and for combat airplanes--from 2,495 to 3,088 units.³

In November 1942, the armed forces of fascist Germany and her allies which were located on the Soviet-German front numbered 51,680 guns and mortars, 5,080 tanks and assault guns, and 3,500 combat airplanes.⁴

As a result, in the autumn of 1942 the Soviet troops had a superiority over the German-fascists in the basic types of armament. This testifies to the great capabilities of the socialist state which was capable of restoring the combat might of the armed forces and accumulating reserves even under the most unfavorable conditions of war.

The shifting of the Soviet Armed Forces from the strategic defense to the strategic offensive put forth new requirements for the armament system. It was necessary to deliver to the active army in the shortest time and in a mass quantity new models of weapons and combat equipment which would be superior to the enemy's armament in their combat qualities.

The technical equipping of the Soviet Army in the second period of the war was accomplished consistently, proceeding from strategic goals and forms of combat with the strict consideration of changes in the level of technical outfitting of the enemy.

The struggle for the advantage in the quality of combat equipment and weapons entered a new phase and assumed an ever more complex and dynamic nature. Beginning with the end of 1942, the Hitlerites were forced to apply feverish efforts in reequipping their tank troops and aviation. Instead of modernized T-III and T-IV medium tanks, they received two new types of heavy tanks, the T-V ("Panther") and T-VI ("Tiger"). Moreover, the Hitlerites received in the inventory the "Ferdinand" 88-mm self-propelled gun, the "Artsturm" 105-mm howitzer, and a 150-mm field howitzer mounted on the chassis of the T-IV tank (both had front armor of 55 and 100 millimeters). New types of airplanes appeared in aviation, the "Focke-Wulf-190A" and the "Heinkel-129" which had improved performance indices. However, they could not regain the technical superiority which had been lost in the previous period.

In 1943 and the first half of 1944, models of the new generation of artillery, tanks, SAU's, and airplanes reached the Soviet Army. More powerful guns possessing higher performance characteristics appeared among the artillery systems. Among them were the 45-mm (Model 1942) and 57-mm (1943) antitank guns which were accepted in the inventory in June 1943, the 76-mm division gun (1942), and the 76-mm regimental gun (1943). The first three artillery systems received a new type of ammunition--sabot shells, and artillery guns with low shell muzzle velocities (76-mm regimental gun and 122-mm division howitzer) received shaped charges. In the corps artillery, the 152-mm howitzer Model 1938 was replaced by the more powerful 152-mm howitzer Model 1943 (D-1). New 120-mm and 160-mm Model 1943 mortars as well as rockets with an improved grouping pattern, the M-13UK and M-31UK, were accepted into the inventory.

Due to the standardization of the carriages, the majority of the artillery systems became considerably lighter (by 500-900 kilograms) and simpler in construction. The armor penetrability of the antitank guns was increased two- to three-fold (from 35-43 mm to 85-100 mm) by lengthening the tube, increasing the caliber, and increasing the shell's muzzle velocity.

The set of small arms also changed. It was replenished with new weapons which were lighter and simpler to handle: the heavy machinegun of P. M. Goryunov (SG-43), the portable submachinegun (PPS) designed by A. I. Sudayev, and the shaped-charge antitank hand grenade (Model 1943).

Fundamental changes also occurred in the system of tank armament. The T-60 and T-70 light tanks and the KV-1s and KV-2 heavy tanks were dropped from the inventory. The T-34 medium tank, on which the first major integrated modernization was conducted, became the basic combat vehicle. A more improved combat machine appeared by the end of 1943--the T-34-85 tank (six-sided cast turret and a long-barrelled 85-mm gun which penetrated armor 100 millimeters thick at 1,000 meters). The JS-1 (with an 85-mm gun) and JS-2 (with a 122 tank gun) heavy tanks were developed and put into production to replace the KV. The latter tank type was 1.2 times superior to the German "Tiger" in armor protection and was 11 tons lighter. The greatest achievement of Soviet tank-building of this period was the development of an entire family of first-generation self-propelled artillery mounts: the light SU-76 [self-propelled] on the base of the T-70 light tank, the medium SU-122 and SU-85 on the base of the T-34 tank, and the heavy SU-152 on the base of the KV-1s tank. The appearance of combat equipment of this type was a complete surprise to the Hitlerites and had a stunning effect on them.

The reequipping of aviation also proceeded swiftly. The first-generation YaK-1, YaK-7, LAGG-3, and MIG-3 fighters were replaced by second-generation aircraft--the YaK-3, YaK-9, LA-5, and LA-7, and a new model, the IL-10 was developed to replace the IL-3 attack aircraft. The more modern PYe-2 and TU-2 began to arrive to replace the PYe-3, PYe-8, and IL-4 bombers. The flying range of the fighters was increased to 1,500 kilometers, their speed was increased by 20-30 percent, and all airplanes received on-board radios. Antitank bombs having a shaped-charge effect and high-explosive bombs weighing from one to five tons went into series production. The attack bombers were armed with large-caliber machineguns and 23-mm and 37-mm cannon.

The equipment status of the Soviet troops had increased immeasurably by the beginning of 1944. The active army contained 94,900 guns and mortars, 5,200 tanks and SAU's, and 10,200 combat aircraft.⁵ In this arsenal, the share of new models (second generation) reached: in small arms--42.3 percent, armored--more than 80 percent, artillery--83 percent, aviation--67 percent.

The successful accomplishment of the greatest task in reequipping the Soviet Army in the shortest time under wartime conditions and without weakening current production in so doing was attained thanks to the titanic efforts of the party and the labor of our people. At this difficult time, all the economic and scientific-technical capabilities of the country were mobilized and the advantages of the socialist system were fully utilized.

The war production of the defense industry was put out on the basis of prepared annual and quarterly plans which were refined by monthly plans. A harmonious system was developed for the direction of all scientific-technical and design forces and a special purposefulness was attached to their activity.

Permanent executive organs were created with the GKO [State Defense Committee] for the direct leadership of specific branches of scientific activity. The work of various commissions, scientists of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and branch scientific-research organizations having defense significance was directed by a special council for the coordination of scientific research.

Powerful collectives of scientists and talented designers engaged in the solution of scientific and technical problems in the interests of the front were created in each branch of the war industry. The Central Tank Design Office (TsTKB) began to function in the spring of 1942 and, with it, a test plant, Central Artillery Design Office, radar equipment plant-institute, subsequently the radar equipment institute and with it a plant, engineering committee, and the necessary proving grounds.

Thus, tasks were accomplished not only to satisfy the immediate requirement of the active army, but a design-technical reserve was also created with consideration of the longer-range prospects. Already in 1943, the latter permitted the completion of work on an armament system which corresponded to the greatest degree to the nature of the concluding operations of World War II and the initial stage of the postwar period.

In the third period of the war, models of equipment and armament which were more powerful in their combat and technical qualities began to arrive to replace the armament which was present. The Model 1944 carbine (with a fixed bayonet) and the self-loading Simonov carbine appeared in the small-arms system. The light machinegun (DP) was replaced by a modernized machinegun (DPM) with a belt feed. Instead of the Goryunov heavy machinegun and the DShK large-caliber machinegun, their modernized models arrived (SGM and DShKM). The RPG-1 hand-held grenade launcher was developed to fire a hollow-charge projectile but its series production was only begun after the war.

The antitank artillery inventory was updated with new guns--the BS-3 100-mm heavy field gun (Model 1944) and the division D-44 85-mm gun (1944) in place of the 76-mm ZIS-3 gun. The armor penetrability of these guns was increased from 100 to 160 millimeters at a range of 500 meters. At the same time, the antiaircraft artillery was supplemented with the 25-mm twin antiaircraft mount while the 85-mm antiaircraft gun model 1944 was accepted in the inventory in 1945. In the rocket artillery, the highly maneuverable BM-31-12 unit having a heavy high-explosive shell with a caliber of 300 millimeters, the M-31UK, was developed. Of the mortar armament, the 120-mm and 240-mm mortars underwent additional modernization.

The equipping of the tank troops, which began to receive new types of combat vehicles, the T-44 medium and JS-3 heavy tanks, also changed. The former was armed with a modernized 85-mm gun, and the latter--with a 122-mm tank gun which could penetrate armor with a thickness of 100-140 millimeters at a range of 500 meters. Models of the second generation of self-propelled artillery mounts were also developed and accepted in the inventory (the SU-100 equipped with a 100-mm naval gun (D-10s) with armor penetrability of up to 160 millimeters at 1,000 meters). New heavy mounts were produced on the base of the JS tank: the JSU-152 having the ML-20s gun-howitzer and the JSU-122s with the D-25 122-mm tank gun. Both had a front armor of 120 millimeters (instead of the 60 millimeters of the first model). Thus, the fronts' requirements for the development of more effective weapons to combat enemy tanks were realized along the lines of increasing armored protection as well as along the lines of increasing the power of antitank and tank guns. The enemy's attempts to oppose Soviet armored equipment with more powerful combat vehicles by creating the superheavy new-model "Tiger-B" tank or the "King Tiger" with a weight of 68 tons and an armor thickness of 150-180 millimeters as well as the self-propelled "Elephant," "Jagdpanther," and "Jagdtiger" with 88-128-mm guns proves to be a belated act.

By the autumn of 1944, significant shifts had occurred in the development of Soviet aviation. It had become completely obvious that airplanes with propeller-driven power plants had reached the culmination point in their perfection. For example, in fighter aviation aircraft attained a speed of 600-700 kilometers per hour and altitudes of 12-13 kilometers. A further increase in speed had become unpromising because of aerodynamic conditions.

The necessity to develop power plants of an absolutely different type arose. Course was set for the development of jet aviation. The first models of Soviet jet airplanes appeared at the end of the war. By this time, the enemy had also reviewed his aviation technology and had begun to shift to the production of the jet fighters ME-262, ME-163, HE-219, and others. The development of jet engines in our country had been conducted even before the war. The designing of the first jet combat aircraft was begun in August 1941 under the direction of V. F. Bolkhovitinov. On 15 May 1942 pilot G. Ya. Bakhchivandzhi accomplished a flight in the first jet airplane. In March 1945 the first jet fighters were put into production: the I-250 of designer A. I. Mikoyan and the S-5 of designer P. O. Sukhoy, which had a speed of 814-825 kilometers per hour. At the end of the war the jet attack bomber

IL-22 of S. V. Il'yushin, a fighter with the LA-7r jet booster, the PYe-2r bomber with a jet power plant, and others were developed.

The last war showed that most important significance is had not only by the scales and rates of growth of military production, but also by its quality characteristics. The struggle for high design indices of the combat equipment which was being waged intensively back on the eve of the war attained its greatest heat in the course of it.

If three and a half years were expended on the development of new types of armament prior to the war (without the time necessary for the transition to series production), then during the war one generation of models of armament was replaced by another in a year and a half or two years. The rate of re-equipping our army outstripped they enemy's rearmament considerably. "The collectives of the enterprises mastered the mass output of new weapons systems in one to three months, which was 10-12 times faster than in peacetime,"⁶ noted member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Defense of the USSR and Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov. The superiority of the socialist society and the political and labor enthusiasm of the Soviet people demonstrated an unshakable vital force and highest effectiveness.

One of the central problems in the organizational development and equipping of the Armed Forces was the creation of the most expedient armament system in which all elements would be organically linked with each other. It served as an object of special concern and attention of our party, the government, and organs of military leadership. The armament system which had been adopted in our army on the eve of World War II was completely satisfactory on the whole but, by the moment of fascist Germany's attack on the USSR, it had not yet been completely formed and had a number of defects: excess duplication and a great number of armament types (2 rifles, 2 pistols, 2 heavy machine-guns, 30 models of guns and mortars, 12 types of tanks, 7 models of fighters, 4 models of bombers, and so forth).

The shortcomings which were presented and which were disclosed in the summer-fall campaign of 1941 were quickly eliminated during the spring and summer of 1942. However, from the experience of the war the circumstance also followed that despite the acute necessity for the development of new types of combat equipment which was present, at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War old weapons were the basic means of combat which permitted bleeding the enemy and gaining time for the establishment of a powerful war economy, shifting its basic nucleus to the east.

With the tremendous scope of war production, it was important to ensure and observe the correct proportions between the basic types of weapons, which required the scientific planning of requisitions and the correct consideration of the troops' requirements and the economy's capabilities. Actually, if difficulties arose in peacetime in creating balanced systems or blocks of armaments, as a rule in connection with the economy's limited capabilities, then during the war the strategic factor was the determining one. It caused

the necessity to balance the types of weapons in the interests of those types which were called upon to accomplish the primary mission in military operations.

The arrival of an ever-increasing quantity of armament and combat equipment in the Soviet Army with their high quality had a direct influence on the improvement in the organizational forms of the Soviet troops and increasing their combat capabilities and scope and results of strategic and front operations.

As a result, the depth and rates of front and army offensive operations continuously increased in the course of the war. In 1941-1942 the depth of front operations did not exceed 70-80 kilometers, and only in the counter-offensive at Moscow did it fluctuate within limits of 90-200 kilometers. In subsequent years, it was increased to 250-300 kilometers and, in individual cases, even to 500-600 kilometers (front offensive operations of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts in the Vistula-Oder operation).

The rates of operations with the troops' advance of 4-5 kilometers per day in the first period of the war subsequently increased to 20-30 kilometers. Depending on the specific conditions and the situation, the depth of army operations fluctuated within limits of 50-180 kilometers.⁷

Thus, in the years of the Great Patriotic War, the central place in the activity of the Communist Party was occupied by questions of the organizational development and strengthening of the Armed Forces on whose combat capability the fate of the Soviet state depended first of all. The war showed that the socialist system has better forms for organizing the economy not only for the accomplishment of national-economic tasks in peacetime, but also for the mobilization of all technical-economic capabilities of the country in the period of the war. The economy of the USSR proved to be much more effective than the economy of fascist Germany in scales and rates of growth of military production and the ability to provide the troops with contemporary combat equipment.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 10, p 340.
2. "Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily" [Soviet Armed Forces]. Voenizdat, 1978, pp 227-232.
3. "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz" [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Vol 5. Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, pp 310,311.
4. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II 1939-1945], Vol 6. Voenizdat, 1976, p 20.

5. "Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily," 1978, p 354.
6. "Na strazhe zavoyevaniy Oktyabrya" [On Guard Over the Achievements of October]. Voenizdat, 1978, p 65.
7. "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945], Vol 4. Voenizdat, 1959, p 813.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: SOVIET ARCTIC, KARELIA

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[Article, published under the heading "Memoirs," by NSU Col Gen A. Zheltov: "On the Right Flank"]

[Text] Much has been written about the course of the Great Patriotic War and about the exploit of the Soviet people in it. However, there are still events which have not received proper elucidation. This pertains, in particular, to the history of the Soviet troops' struggle in the Arctic and Karelia.

As a participant in the defensive battles and engagements of the war's first year on the right flank of the Soviet-German front*, I should like to tell about the main events and special features of the struggle with the aggressor in this period by the troops of the Northern and then of the Karelian Fronts, how the Karelian Front was created and gained strength, and about the heroism, bravery, and steadfastness of the personnel of its units and large units. In so doing, I fully realize the complexity and scale of this problem as a whole and do not claim to describe the history of this formation.

The border engagement. The Hitlerite command employed large forces for the invasion of the Soviet Arctic and Karelia. The 150,000-man Army "Norway" of the Wehrmacht was deployed on the territory of Norway and in Northern Finland from Varangerfjord to Suomussalmi under the command of General N. Falkenhorn. The 3th Air Force, which supported its offensive numbered up to 500 airplanes. Five destroyers, six submarines, and other ships of the German Navy were assembled in Norway's northern ports. Moreover, the use of three torpedo boats, two mine-layers, and ten escort ships from among the captured Norwegian ships was envisaged.

This army included regiments and divisions headed by experienced officers and specially trained for waging war under northern mountain-desert

* From September 1941 through July 1942 A. S. Zheltov was member of the military council of the Karelian Front.

conditions. Its troops included mountain Jaegers who had taken Crete, 88 grenadiers, and Tyrolean riflemen who had participated in the campaign to capture Norway. And Colonel General Falkenhorst--a Hitler favorite--and the commander of the 5th Air Force, the "fiery" General Stumpf, had the reputation of being invincible among the fascist generals. Before this, the Hitlerites had not known defeat. Spoiled by easy victories in the West, they counted on a rapid, bloodless victory here, too: some of them boasted that they would drink tea in Murmansk three days after the start of military operations.

According to the calculations of the Hitlerite command, Army "Norway" was to destroy the Soviet main forces in the border area during the first two weeks of military operations and to capture Polyarnyy, Murmansk, Kandalaksha, Loukhi, and the entire Kola Peninsula. Subsequently, it was planned to penetrate deep into the Soviet North, seize Arkhangel'sk and, prior to the onset of cold weather, close the Soviet Navy's exit through the Barents and White Seas.

The Finnish Marshal K. Mannerheim also had big forces available. They numbered up to 650,000 men. The Finnish Navy consisted of 80 ships and boats, including 7 ships of the basic classes. The Air Force numbered 307 airplanes. Mannerheim's troops received the mission to destroy the force of Soviet troops in the border zone in a short time, seize the Karelian Isthmus, reach Svir', and link up with the German-fascist troops which were advancing on Leningrad.

Following V. I. Lenin's instruction to "be on the alert" for the imperialists' intrigues, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government constantly devoted serious attention to ensuring the reliable defense of our state. The necessary measures were also adopted in the north of the European part--in the Arctic and Karelia--because of their exceptional politico-economic and strategic significance. For it was namely through the Arctic that in 1918 the interventionists intruded on the territory of Soviet Russia and captured Murmansk. After this, they tried to break through to Moscow along the railroad through Karelia. And again, as the documents of the Hitlerite and Mannerheim command show today, the capture of the wealth of this territory was discussed.

An important step in the matter of strengthening the security of the Arctic and Karelia was the fact that in 1940 the state boundary in Karelia was shifted somewhat to the west. Not long before the Great Patriotic War the Northern Fleet was created as an independent operational large naval force intended for the defense of the northern sea borders and to cover our ground forces from the sea. The northern coast of the European part of the USSR was covered by a defensive area.

The 14th Army (one fortified area, four rifle and one tank divisions) was located on the Murmansk and Kandalaksha directions by the start of the war. The 7th Army (one fortified area and four rifle divisions) was located in Karelia, north of Lake Ladoga. On the Karelian Isthmus, the 23d Army covered

Leningrad on the northwest. It was part of the Leningrad Military District which was redesignated the Northern Front on 24 June 1941 (commander Lieutenant General M. M. Popov, member of the military council Corps Commissar N. N. Klimont'yev, chief of staff Major General D. N. Nikishin). The enemy had a numerical superiority in men and equipment. On individual directions of attack the Hitlerites and Mannerheimites were three to five times superior to our forces.

The invasion of the enemy troops began on eight directions which were isolated from one another and at different times because of the special features of the theater of military operations. Thanks to this, after 22 June it turned out that our troops had from 7 to 15 days available to occupy previously envisioned lines and to improve them. The enemy did not have advantages of the surprise factor here. And this circumstance exerted an influence on the successful conduct of the border engagement by the Soviet troops.

The attack on the Murmansk direction by the XIX Mountain-Rifle Corps of the German-fascist troops began on 29 June. It immediately encountered stubborn resistance by the units of the 14th Rifle Division (commander Major General A. A. Zhurba, from 11 July--Major General N. N. Nikishin, military commissar Senior Battalion Commissar M. I. Petrov) and then of the 52d Rifle Division (commander Major General N. N. Nikishin, from 28 July--Colonel G. A. Veshchezerskiy, military commissar Regimental Commissar M. V. Orlov) which had reached the Zapadnaya Litsa River. Attacking in a narrow zone and suffering tremendous losses, during July and the first half of August the corps could advance 25-30 kilometers to the east of the state boundary. It was stopped on the Zapadnaya Litsa River (see figure). All Hitlerite attempts to seize the Rybachiy and Sredniy Peninsulas were defeated by the units of the fortified area (commander of the fortified area Major General A. Ye. Krasil'nikov) with the active combat support and constant material and technical assistance of the units and ships of the Northern Fleet.

On the Kalandaksha direction the main forces of the Hitlerite XXXVI Army Corps began their offensive on 1 July. Here, too, the aggressor's lightning strike was also unsuccessful although he had numerical superiority. Two of our divisions of the XLII Rifle Corps (commander Major General R. I. Panin, military commissar Brigade Commissar K. P. Isayev), the 122d (commander Major General P. S. Shevchenko, military commissar Regimental Commissar P. G. Ryazanov) and the 1st Tank (commander Major General V. I. Baranov, military commissar Brigade Commissar K. P. Kulik) heroically defended each foot of ground.* They executed an orderly withdrawal to a prepared position east of Alakurta in difficult battles.

On 8 July, the XXXVI Army Corps undertook an attack on the Kesten'ga-Loukhi direction where one regiment of the 104th Rifle Division and the 72d Border Detachment were defending but here, too, the enemy was stopped not far from the state boundary--on the Sof'yanga River. On 3 August, reinforcing the

* In the middle of July the 1st Tank Division was transferred to another sector of the Northern Front--at Luga.

force with the fresh 88 "Nord" Division and one tank battalion, the enemy again undertook an attack on this direction. Repelling numerous assaults, Soviet troops were forced to withdraw toward Kesten'ga. It was necessary for the command of the Northern Front to interfere. The newly formed 5th Rifle Brigade (commander Colonel N. A. Chernukha) and units of the 88th Rifle Division, which had arrived from Arkhangel'sk (division commander Major General A. I. Zelentsov, military commissar A. M. Martynov) were transferred to this direction. The enemy attack was stopped 30 kilometers west of Loukhi.

On 3 July, two divisions of the Finnish III Corps launched an attack on the Ukhta direction. Two regiments of the 54th Rifle Division stubbornly held the line on the Voynitsa River (near the state boundary) for 10 days. In the middle of July the Finns broke through our defense here at a cost of tremendous losses, forcing our troops to withdraw to a line 10 kilometers west of Ukhta.

On 3 July, the Finnish forces launched an attack on the Reboły direction. Here, they encountered the organized resistance of one regiment of the 54th Division and the 73d Border Detachment. In the course of fierce battles, inflicting heavy losses in men and materiel on the enemy, these few Soviet troops withdrew to the line of the Pizhma River. Here, the 27th Rifle Division (commander Colonel G. K. Kozlov, military commissar I. N. Romanov) was formed from individual units.

On 3 July, the main forces of the Finnish Army launched an attack on the Petrozavodsk direction. Here on the state boundary, the enemy assaults were beaten back for seven days by the units and subunits of the 54th Rifle Division (commander Major General I. V. Panin, military commissar G. Ya. Sevast'yanov), the 168th Rifle Division* (commander Colonel A. L. Bondarev, military commissar Senior Battalion Commissar S. L. Aleksandrov), and the 71st Rifle Division (commander Colonel V. N. Fedorov, military commissar Senior Battalion Commissar A. P. Baryshnikov). Only by 15 July were the Mannerheim troops, suffering tremendous losses, able to reach the line of the Yanis-Yoki River where they were stopped. In the middle of August, Mannerheim transferred two fresh divisions to help this army. From that time, the directions along the shore of Lake Ladoga to Olonets and to Petrozavodsk were already clearly determined in the operations of the enemy Karelian army.

The Petrozavodsk group (commander Lieutenant General M. A. Antonyuk) was formed for the more effective covering of the Petrozavodsk direction and better control of our troops' combat activity. It contained several rifle regiments, separate assault battalions, two tank battalions, several artillery batteries, and the 272d Rifle Division which had come up (commander Colonel M. I. Potapov, military commissar Senior Battalion Commissar S. I. Vikhrov).

Thus, in the course of a two-month battle in the Arctic and Karelia the troops of the 14th and 7th Armies together with the border guards and in coordination with units of the Northern Fleet frustrated the enemy's intentions

* On 21 July, the 168th Division was transferred to the 23d Army.

to destroy the Soviet troops on the border zone. In these battles, the German-fascist and Mannerheim divisions were thoroughly mauled and could not continue the attack.

It can be said that the Soviet troops of the Northern Front, displaying heroism and bravery, in essence won the border battle and that namely in July-August 1941 on the right flank of the Soviet-German strategic front the foundations for the failure of the Wehrmacht's offensive strategy in the North were laid. Of course then, in August, neither the command of Army "Norway" nor the Mannerheim clique had lost hopes for continuation of the offensive, but they already linked it more with the results of the offensive by the German-fascist troops at Leningrad and on the Moscow direction where a decisive battle was under way at this time.

Formation of the Karelian Front. By the middle of August 1941, the importance of the strategic significance of the defense of the Arctic and Karelia began to be disclosed more and more clearly. The governments of the United States and Britain had declared their intentions to render military-technical assistance to the Soviet Union in accordance with the lend-lease law. The warm-water port of Murmansk and Arkhangel'sk were considered as the most convenient transshipping bases for the cargoes arriving from these countries; the Kirovsk Railroad and its Soroka-Obozerskiy branch, which had been completed already in the course of the war, became one of the important main lines for the movement of cargoes to the south.

This circumstance, as well as the difficulty in leading the troops on a 1,000-kilometer front, forced the Headquarters, Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] to adopt a decision on 23 August concerning the division of the Northern Front into two independent operational large units.

The Leningrad Front which was newly formed on 27 August (commander Lieutenant General M. M. Popov, member of the military council Corps Commissar N. N. Klement'yev, chief of staff Colonel N. V. Gorodetskiy) included the 8th, 23d, 42d, 48th, and 55th Armies. The Karelian Front joined together two armies--the 14th (commander Major General R. I. Panin, member of the military council Major General A. Ya. Sergeyev, chief of staff Colonel M. I. Malitskiy) whose troops defended the Soviet Arctic, and the 7th (commander Lieutenant General F. D. Gorelenko, member of the military council Division Commissar M. N. Zelenkov, chief of staff Major General A. N. Krutikov) which was fighting north of Lake Ladoga in Karelia. The Northern Fleet was operationally subordinated to the front.

Appointed as commander of the Karelian Front was Lieutenant General V. A. Frolov who commanded the 14th Army prior to this, the member of the military council was the author of this article, at that time a corps commissar (I had arrived from the Far Eastern Front), and the chief of staff was Colonel L. S. Svirskiy, former chief of staff of the 14th Army. Belomorsk was determined as the place for location of the front's field headquarters.

Key:

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| 1. Army "Norway" | 6. Legend |
| 2. 20th Mountain Army | 7. Situation on 22 June 1941 |
| 3. Karelian Army | 8. Situation on 5 September 1941 |
| 4. Southeastern Army | 9. Situation by June 1942. |
| 5. 7th Separate Army | |

The leaders of our front's field headquarters were made up of "northern old-timers." Thus, the front commander and chief of staff were participants in the Soviet-Finnish conflict and had experience in the command of an army and the direction of an army staff. Many officers and generals of the front headquarters and command personnel of the units and large units of combined-arms armies were experienced and tempered in preceding battles. I, just as other comrades, was to join actively in the combat activity of the troops using the knowledge and experience of peacetime work.

From its first steps, the front military council had to solve many extremely difficult problems: to man and put together a staff, directorates, sections, and services of the field headquarters; to organize stable communications with the troops and ensure firm control of their combat activity; to create the front rear services under the specific conditions of the North; to organize operational communications with the leadership of the Northern Fleet; and, finally, the direct supervision of life and activity in the entire zone of the front.

The latter task was accomplished on the basis of practice during the period of peace when leaders of local party organs were included as members of the military councils. Thus, the secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee of the Karelian-Finnish Republic, G. N. Kupriyanov, was appointed a member of the front military council. In this connection, he was awarded the rank of brigade commissar. The first secretary of the Murmansk obkom, M. I. Starostin, was appointed as a member of the military council of the Northern Fleet and the 14th Army.

The front military council immediately established close working contact with the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Council of Peoples Commissars of the Karelo-Finnish Republic, O. V. Kuusinen, P. S. Prokkonen, with the secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, Yu. V. Andropov, the chairman of the Murmansk ispolkom, A. M. Kol'tsov, and others as well as with the leading comrades of the party and soviet organizations of the Arkhangel'skaya and Vologodskaya oblasts. This permitted solving all problems in the life and activity of local organizations in accordance with the military situation, which had tremendous significance for the strengthening of the front rear area (chief brigade commander P. A. Mikhaylov, deputy for political affairs Colonel Sorokin), the mobilization of the population for the construction of defensive works, the creation of partisan detachments, and the formation of units and large units of the people's volunteer corps. The front leadership faced the difficult task of making up losses in personnel, weapons, ammunition, and equipment.

From the answer to my direct appeal to the chief of the General Staff, B. M. Shaposhnikov, I understood that this was an inopportune time for us. However, our requests did not remain without the attention of the center. Despite the difficulty of the situation on the entire Soviet-German front in the period of the autumn battles, the front was reinforced by several divisions, and in December it received seven more brigades of seamen and up to 10 ski and reindeer-ski battalions. The leadership of the front air force, in the person of General T. T. Khryukin and his chief of staff, Colonel I. M. Sokolov, had to do much work on creating an air army and supporting it with a network of airfields as well as materiel. Airfields were built in the area of Belomorsk with the aid of local organizations and by involving the population in the construction. Because of the unsuitable ground, it was necessary to surface the runway of this airfield with boards placed on the edges. The experiment proved to be favorable and the commander of the Red Army Air Force, General P. F. Zhigarev, became interested in it.

The variety and rather difficult tasks which faced the front military council and the leader personnel required the maximum degree of organization and the mobilization of all personnel, and primarily the communists and Komsomols, for their accomplishment. In accordance with the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 16 July 1941, it was necessary to convert the propaganda directorates and sections into political directorates and sections of formations and large units and to create the institutions of commissars in the regiments and divisions while political deputies were appointed in companies and batteries. Great work remained to be done in implementing the decree of the VKP (b) [All Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] of 19 August on the procedure for accepting in the party servicemen who had especially distinguished themselves in battles. All this multifaceted work was headed by the front's political directorate led by Division Commissar A. G. Rumyantsev. These decisions of the state's supreme organ and our party's Central Committee were warmly welcomed by commanders, political officers, personnel, and party organizations of units and large units which contributed their combat experience and knowledge to their practical realization.

Defeat of the Hitlerites' September offensive against Murmansk. During the period of the Karelian Front's formation, the enemy displayed activity on two main directions in essence--on the Murmansk and Petrozavodsk-Olonets directions: the former led Army "Norway" toward Polyarnyy and Murmansk, and the latter--the Karelian Army to the Svir' River and Volkhov--to a link-up with Army Group "North."

In the first days of September the front military council received information on the intentions of the Army "Norway" command to undertake a new offensive against Murmansk, for which the 2d Mountain Rifle Division and SS units had been additionally transferred to it. The military council warned the command of the 14th Army of this. Considering the importance of the direction and the necessity to become acquainted with the troops and their readiness to repel the Hitlerites' attack on the ground, I rode out to this army with a group of officers.

Spending several days in the units of the 52d and 14th Divisions which were covering the shortest path to Murmansk, we were convinced that they were conducting defensive battles skillfully. The men were morally strong, angered at the enemy, and were able to repel his attack. And of course, we tried to meet more with the personnel of the units and to tell them about the situation on the fronts, about the heroic defense of Leningrad, and about the importance of the defense on the Zapadnaya Litsa River where the enemy was preparing the attack.

The enemy XIX Mountain Rifle Corps launched the attack on 7 September. Enemy aviation increased its activity sharply. Fierce battles continued here without interruption until the end of September. Units of the 52d Rifle Division beat back all enemy assaults with large losses for him. The division firmly held its occupied positions. The battle developed differently on the sector of the 14th Rifle Division. Under the blows of superior enemy forces, its units were forced to withdraw to the eastern bank of the Zapadnaya Litsa River. Exploiting this success, the command of Army "Norway" threw in additional infantry forces and aviation here and tried to exploit the success.

However, in accordance with the instructions of the front commander General R. I. Panin, employing the Polar Division which had been transferred to him and which had been formed of home guardsmen in Murmansk (commander Colonel S. V. Kolomeyets), prepared a counterstroke. The Northern Fleet provided artillery and air support of this strike.

The counterstroke was conducted on 17 October. In the course of this fight, the troops of the army destroyed the 3d Mountain Rifle Division, throwing its remnants across the Zapadnaya Litsa River. From that time, the front on the Murmansk direction was finally stabilized and remained unchanged for three years--until October 1944 when the offensive by troops of the Karelian Front (Petsamo-Kirkenes operation), which ended with the total defeat of the German-fascist troops, was begun from this line.

At the same time, enemy attempts to continue the attack on the Kandalaksha and Loukhi directions were foiled. In these battles, the enemy XXXVI Corps was also bled white. True, some of his individual units continued to attack our positions even later, but our defense proved to be impregnable right up to the launching of a general offensive by the Soviet troops.

It should be remembered that the North's geographic conditions created great difficulties. On the Murmansk direction, the terrain permitted the conduct of combat operations by the troops in a comparatively narrow zone--25-30 kilometers. The maneuver of forces was hampered here and the employment of big forces and several types of heavy equipment was excluded. Specific meteorological phenomena, for example the duration of daylight or darkness, at times had a negative influence on the morale and psychological condition of the people. Interference with radio communications often arose (aurora borealis).

The party organization of Murmansk and Murmanskaya oblast played a tremendous role in organizing the defense of the Arctic. It sent about half its personnel to the front. In the first months of the war, 2,100 communists and three fourths of the Komsomols took off for the front from Murmansk. I should like to stress the role of our Northern Fleet. It dependably covered the right flank of the Karelian Front and ensured sea communications and the conveying of transports with cargoes from the United States and Britain. The seamen constantly launched strikes on the enemy's ships and important bases and helped the troops of the 14th Army with artillery and aviation as well as landing amphibious assault forces. They accomplished the difficult mission of supplying our garrisons on Rybachiy and Sredniy Peninsulas with all necessities. We established close contact with the command of the Northern Fleet, Vice Admiral A. G. Golovko and member of the military council A. A. Nikolayev. Here, an important role was played by periodic meetings at the level of front and fleet military councils.

The battle north of Ladoga. At the beginning of September, the situation of the Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus continued to remain tense. The 23d Army (commander Lieutenant General A. I. Cherepanov, member of the military council Brigade Commissar V. V. Sosnovikov) had halted the advance of Mannerheim's Southeastern Army on the line of the 1939 state boundary and successfully beat back enemy assaults, preventing the link-up of the Mannerheim large units with Army Group "North." North of Ladoga, the troops of our 7th Army executed a fighting withdrawal on the Olonets direction under the blows of superior enemy forces. In connection with the aggravation of the situation on the front's left flank, the military council conducted a number of additional measures to strengthen the defense. To assist the army command, the front military council headed by the front commander and a group of officers from the field headquarters rode out to Petrozavodsk.

The study of the state of affairs on the spot helped to define in detail the situation and the condition of the troops. The army's divisions had suffered losses in preceding battles. It was extremely difficult to replenish them with fresh forces. The troops were dispersed over a large front, which hindered their control from Petrozavodsk. Army headquarters' communications with the divisions were often disrupted and considerable efforts and time were required to restore them. The rapidly changing situation and the stretching out of the line of defense adversely affected the already extremely difficult problems of supplying the troops with ammunition, food, and medical supplies. The withdrawal had an unfavorable effect on the morale and psychological condition of the personnel.

On the army's right flank, the enemy continuously attacked the positions of our 54th Rifle Division with two divisions on a line 10 kilometers west of Ukhta. The division command (commander Major General I. V. Panin, commissar G. Ya. Sevast'yanov) requested permission to withdraw its regiments to a new defensive line which had been prepared along the eastern bank of the Shomba River (that is, to withdraw more than 120 kilometers to the east), justifying this by the inconvenience of the occupied position for defense and

the fear of finding itself far in the rear, on the flank of the advancing enemy Karelian Army. These arguments were rejected by the front military council. The division received the mission to hold the occupied position firmly. Defending here, it was to draw considerable enemy forces, constantly threatening his left flank and forcing the Mannerheim forces to "glance" back. In the end, this could assist the accomplishment of the mission of the 7th Army on the Olonets-Petrozavodsk direction.

The personal participation and rendering assistance by the front military council in organizing the army's defense had its beneficial influence on the subsequent course of the battle north of Ladoga. Its fighting men and commanders were inspired by the appeal of the military council of 5 September which gave a truthful estimate of the situation, stressed the importance of the army's mission, and called upon all fighting men and commanders to defend each foot of Soviet land, destroy the high-handed enemy, and halt his offensive.

The defensive battles of the troops of this army north of Ladoga did not stop for three weeks. On 21 September, at the price of great losses the enemy nevertheless broke through to the western shore of Lake Ladoga, south of Petrozavodsk, dividing the army's forces into two parts. The army's main forces, having withdrawn to the line of the Svir' River, found itself cut off from the headquarters which were located in Petrozavodsk. In the situation which had developed, the Headquarters, Supreme High Command took the 7th Army from the Karelian Front on our request (it was converted into a Separate Army directly subordinate to the Headquarters, Supreme High Command [Hq SHC]; General K. A. Meretskov was appointed commander). The military council assigned the defense of Petrozavodsk to the group of General F. D. Gorlenko. It included the separate units which covered Petrozavodsk, and then the formed 37th Rifle Division (commander Lieutenant Colonel F. I. Litvinov, military commissar Regimental Commissar A. M. Pyatakov) as well as the 272d (commander Major General M. S. Knyazev, military commissar Senior Battalion Commissar S. I. Vikhrov).

The Petrozavodsk operational group stubbornly defended each line, holding back the offensive of the superior forces of the enemy Karelian Army. At the end of September, Mannerheim committed two fresh infantry divisions and several tank battalions to this direction from the reserve. On 30 September the Mannerheim forces broke through our defense and rushed toward Petrozavodsk. In connection with the threat to the city and the danger of being cut off in it, the group commander, F. D. Gorelenko, was permitted to abandon the capital of Soviet Karelia from which the government institutions and the population had already been evacuated. The 37th and 313th Divisions withdrew to the northern bank of the Shuya River, while the 272d Division and units of the people's volunteer corps were loaded on barges and taken across Lake Onega to the area of Oshta to reinforce the Separate Army.

The military council maintained constant communications with the commander of the Separate Army, General K. A. Meretskov, informing him of our state of affairs on the left flank and he, in turn, found the opportunity to keep the

military council of the Karelian Front abreast of events in his army's defensive zone. Thus, operational coordination was established and played a role of no little importance in repelling the subsequent enemy attempt to completely close the ring of encirclement northeast of Leningrad.

In October, after the capture of Petrozavodsk the Mannerheim troops continued to develop the attack on Medvezh'yegorsk. In this connection, the headquarters of the 7th Army was removed from subordination to the Karelian Front; on 14 October it was decided to create an operational group of forces consisting of the 71st Division (commander Colonel M. F. Pepelyayev, commissar A. P. Baryshnikov), the 313th, and 37th Rifle Divisions and the 2d Rifle Brigade. The group was headed by General M. S. Knyazev while Battalion Commissar B. I. Pogachevskiy was appointed member of the military council.

The Finnish troops reached the Belomorsk-Baltic Canal. It was clear to us that the enemy intended to turn to the north after forcing the canal at Gabsel'ga and, using the Morskaya Masel'ga-Lapino road, to reach the shore of the White Sea and cut the Soroka-Obozerskaya railroad line. The troops of the Karelian Front could find themselves in a serious position and it would become impossible to accomplish the free movement of freight from Murmansk. However, the enemy did not achieve this goal, either.

The battles at Medvezh'yegorsk continued until the beginning of December. At the end of November, the Mannerheim forces undertook a decisive offensive, launching simultaneous strikes in the direction of the city from the south and west. Units of the 71st and 313th Divisions beat back five to seven assaults per day, often launching counterattacks. The city went from hand to hand. However, our troops had to abandon Medvezh'yegorsk and withdraw over the ice to the eastern shore of the Povenetskiy Gulf.

Considering this threat and the fact that the Medvezh'yegorsk group had actually been divided into two parts, it was decided (27 December) to create the Masel'ga operational group consisting of the 289th and 267th Rifle Division. Command of it was assigned to Major General G. A. Veshchezerskiy, the experienced commander of the 52d Division, and then of the operations group of the Murmansk direction who knew this sector of the Karelian Front (during the Soviet-Finnish armed conflict he commanded a regiment of the 54th Division here) while Brigade Commissar V. T. Pisklyukov, a regular political officer who had considerable combat experience by this time, was appointed member of the group's military council.

In connection with the relief of M. S. Knyazev, who did not provide firm control of the troops, from command, the Medvezh'yegorsk group was headed by Major General S. G. Trofimenko. It was assigned the mission to dig in on the line of the southern sector of the Belomorsk-Baltic Canal, prepare an attack with the immediate mission of capturing Medvezh'yegorsk, throwing the enemy back toward Chebino, and thereby straightening the front line.

Thus, the line of our defense was finally stabilized on the left flank of the Karelian Front, too, by the beginning of December 1941. The Finns succeeded in reaching Lake Onega and cutting the Kirovsk Railroad on the sector from Podporozh'ya to Masel'gskaya. However, they did not attain their final strategic goals--to reach Volkhov and, in the north, the White Sea. In a fierce defensive battle north of Ladoga, the numerically small force on the left flank of the Karelian Front wore down the Karelian Army and bled it white and forced the aggressor to assume the defense finally and irrevocably.

In the battle for Leningrad, despite desperate efforts, Army Group "North" which Hitler had reinforced with fresh forces in October could not link up with Mannerheim's forces and completely blockade the city. The important strategic goal of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht--to capture the cradle of the socialist revolution--was not attained.

I should like to stress that the first five months of the Karelian Front's existence were the most difficult for our troops. Overcoming difficulties, in the autumn of 1941 in the Arctic and Karelia our troops bled the enemy white and forced him to assume the defensive at a distance of 25-80-150 kilometers east of the state boundary. Thanks to the tremendous straining of spiritual forces and to the mass heroism and high level of combat skill of the fighting men and commanders of the Karelian and other fronts, the road to Leningrad and Murmansk was firmly shut to the Hitlerites and their Mannerheim allies.

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WARTIME DOCUMENTS: BREZHNEV PARTY-POLITICAL SUPPORT PLAN

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 79 signed to press 23 Nov 79 pp 41-45

[Article, published under the heading "Documents and Materials," by Col (Res) V. Rodionov, instructor at the Novorossiysk Higher Engineering Naval School: "Planning of Party-Political Work by the Political Section of the 18th Army During the Period of the Novorossiysk Assault Landing Operation (September 1943)." Also included is an excerpt from the 18th Army operations plan signed by (then) Colonel Brezhnev, chief of the 18th Army political section.]

[Text] Documents previously unpublished anywhere and pertaining to the planning and organization of party-political work in the Novorossiysk assault landing operation (September 1943) have been discovered in the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense USSR [TsAMO SSSR]. The operation was conducted by the 18th Army and the Black Sea Fleet and was the most important component part and first stage in the Novorossiysk-Taman' operation. The victory at Novorossiysk had great significance. "It supported the development of the attack by the North Caucasus Front which led to the expulsion of the enemy from the entire Taman' Peninsula and the victorious conclusion of the battle for the Caucasus."¹

Among the documents which were found is the plan of measures of the 18th Army's political section for party-political work in support of the assault landing operation which was developed and signed by the chief of the army's political section, Colonel L. I. Brezhnev, and approved by the commander, Lieutenant General K. N. Leselidze. L. I. Brezhnev writes in the book "Malaya Zemlya": "We attached no less significance to party-political support of the operation than to its combat preparation."²

Thanks to the energetic activity of the chief of the 18th Army political section, Colonel L. I. Brezhnev, the chief of the Black Sea Fleet's political directorate, Captain 1st Rank V. I. Semin, and the chief of the Novorossiysk Naval Base's political section, Captain 1st Rank M. I. Bakayev, the clear coordination of political organs and party and Komsomol organizations of the army and navy was attained.

The plan for party-political support of the Novorossiysk assault landing operation was drawn up with special thoroughness. Each political officer and party and Komsomol activist knew not only what, but also when, where, and how he was to conduct one measure or another. From the first day of preparation for the operation, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev was personally engaged in the selection and instruction of political personnel cadres. He sent 23 officers to the assault units to assist commanders and political officers in organizing party-political work.

The army political section involved not only organizational political officers in the realization of the plan, but also the broad party-Komsomol and combat activists. Conferences of deputy regimental and battalion (including artillery battalion) commanders for political affairs were conducted in the divisions, while in the units agitators and editors of operational notes sheets were instructed in questions of their work in the period of the preparation and landing of the assault force. The manuals on the conduct of naval operations were studied with the political personnel.³

One of the main tasks was work on the creation of full-blooded party organizations in all units. A large influx of fighting men and commanders who had distinguished themselves in battles into the party's ranks was observed in the preparatory period. One hundred thirty-four applications were submitted on 7 and 8 September 1943 in the 255th Red Banner Naval Infantry Brigade.⁴ By the beginning of September, the 18th Army counted 14,206 communists and 8,069 Komsomols.⁵ The party and Komsomol layer in the companies and batteries reached 35-45 percent, and in the assault units--up to 68 percent.⁶

The basic content of agitation-propaganda work was: instilling an offensive spirit and hatred for the enemy, vigilance, a readiness to accomplish any mission, the study of the experience in past assault landing operations, and propagandizing the successes of the Soviet Army and the heroism of the fighting men and commanders which was displayed in the battles for Odessa, Sevastopol', Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Malaya Zemlya. Participants in these battles were sent to the assault landing units and subunits where they conducted talks with Red Army men, shared their combat experiences, and told of the significance which the operation being prepared had. The army political section created a special agitation detachment of 25 Kuniakov-communists. They were sent on detached service to the subunits of the 318th Rifle Division and the 255th Naval Infantry Brigade where they shared their experience in the landing of an amphibious assault force at Myskhako.

Active participation in mass-agitation and propaganda work was had by the leading command personnel and political officers of the army, its large units, and units. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev personally visited all the units which were preparing for the assault landing. He gave lectures and political reports at conferences of chiefs of political sections and at seminars of party and Komsomol organizers; he explained to them the tasks, forms, and methods for party-political work in an assault landing operation and in the course of battles for Novorossiysk, talked with the fighting men and commanders, and studied their requirements and attitudes.

In the course of preparations for the assault landing operation, party and Komsomol meetings took place in all units and on ships; they discussed questions concerning the place and role of communists and Komsomols in the accomplishment of the combat mission. And short meetings took place in all rifle units, assault detachments, and on ships an hour before the attack. L. I. Brezhnev personally participated in the preparation and conduct of many of them.

The high combat readiness of the troops and an irrepressible offensive spirit were ensured as a result of the intense work of commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol organizations. "...The well-organized life of the beachhead," writes Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in "Malaya Zemlya," "concern for the economy of forces and the health of the fighting men, the air corps which were sent in time, the happy jokes at a slack moment, and selfless bravery in the assaults, and the fact that people remained people to the end--all this was the consequence of party-political work."

The document published below provides a graphic impression of the planning, content, forms, and methods of party-political work in the period of the preparation and conduct of the Novorossiysk assault-landing operation.

FROM THE PLAN OF MEASURES OF THE 18TH ARMY POLITICAL SECTION FOR PARTY-POLITICAL SUPPORT OF THE ASSAULT LANDING OPERATION ⁵

1. Preparatory Period

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| <p>1. Select, brief, and send on detached service personnel of the army political section to units and large units to render practical assistance to political officers in supporting the combat operation</p> <p>20 dsk [expansion unknown]:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Kulik [P. I.], Skornichenko, [A. K.], Isayev [P. I.], Levin [I. V.], Vaytsman [B. I.], Kaytukov (G. Kh.)</p> <p>318th Rifle Division:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Mutitsin [Ch. Ya.], Arzumanyan [A. A.], Moskalenko [A. P.], Kondrat'yev [B. P.], Yakunin [F. F.]</p> <p>255th Red Banner Naval Infantry Bde.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Tsedrik [A. D.], Novik, [A. N.] Puzik [I. Ye.], Konstantinov [G. F.], Lysenko [V. K.]</p> | <p>2.09 Brezhnev [L. I.]</p> |
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290th NKVD Regiment:

Klyunenko [A. S.], Pavelko
[I. I.]

Kunikov Detachment:

Matyushenko [D. I.], Yurkin
[G. N.]

1339th Rifle Regiment

Movshovich [A. A.], Dzhabua
[D. A.]

Army Artillery Units:

Chupakhin [I. P.]

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| 2. Conduct conference of deputy regimental, battalion, and artillery battalion commanders for political affairs and party organizers with the question: "On the tasks of party-political work in the period of preparation and accomplishment of a combat operation." | 2.09 | Chief of political section and personnel of army political section |
| 3. Assist chiefs of political sections and party political apparatus in drawing up plans of party-political work for the period of preparation and conduct of combat operation | 2-3.09 | Personnel of army political section |
| 4. Prepare and conduct party and Komsomol meetings in primary party and Komsomol organizations with agenda: "On the tasks of communists and Komsomols in the accomplishment of a combat operation."
Assist party and Komsomol organizers in giving assignments to communists and Komsomols for the period of combat operations | 3-4.09 | Chiefs of political sections, deputy commanders for political affairs and personnel of army political section |
| 5. Disclose participants in the defense of Odessa, Sevastopol', Leningrad, and Stalingrad and prepare them to conduct talks with participants in the assault landing. "On the heroic actions of the fighting men and commanders in the defense of Soviet cities." | 3-4.09 | Deputy commanders for political affairs and personnel of army political section |

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| 6. Conduct briefing of agitators and editors of operational news sheets on questions of their practical work in the period of preparation and landing of assault landing force | 3.09 Deputy commanders for political affairs and party organizers |
| 7. Organize the appearance of Kunikov detachment of agitators among the fighting men and commanders of assault forces: "On the experience and shortcomings in the conduct of an assault landing operation..." | 3-4.09 Yurkin [G. N.]
Matyushenko [D. I.] |
| 9. Disclose all servicemen who have not taken military oath and administer the oath to them | 3-4.09 Chiefs of political sections, deputy commanders for political affairs |
| 10. Assist party-political apparatus in selection and assignment of communists and Komsomols and combat activists on decisive sectors and especially in first-echelon units and subunits | 3-4.09 Personnel of army political section and large-unit political sections |
| 11. Prepare draft letter of army military council to personnel of assault landing group of forces | 2-3.09 Pakhomov S. |
| 12. Organize daily broadcasts of Red Army successes over MGU [powerful loudspeaker unit] and OGU [trench loudspeaker unit] | from Klyuyev
3.09 |
| 13. Organize study of manual on conduct of sea operations with political personnel | 4-4.09 Chiefs of political sections |
| 14. Conduct talks with personnel on subjects:
a) On international situation;
b) On military honor;
c) On political and morale state of enemy troops...
d) On atrocities of the fascist aggressors;
e) Comrade Stalin's orders Nos 95 and 195 | Agitators, personnel of political sections and army political section |

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| 15. Check readiness of medical-sanitary institutions and their support with personnel, medicines, bandages, and equipment
Single out the best political personnel to ensure clear work of medical-sanitary institutions in the evacuation of wounded | 3.09 | Chiefs of political sections and personnel of army political section |
| 16. Assist commanders in checking the readiness of personnel to accomplish the combat mission and adopt necessary measures to supply ammunition, food, and equipment | 3-4.09 | Chiefs of political sections and personnel of army political section |
| 17. On day of landing, publish operational news sheets on ships and conduct short meetings of personnel | | Chiefs of political sections, commanders, their political deputies |
| 18. Adopt measures against penetration of spies and saboteurs to landing sites | | Chiefs of political sections, personnel of army political section |

II. Work on Ships

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| 19. Ensure order, discipline, camouflage, and implicit accomplishment of naval chiefs' demands | | Political deputies and personnel of army political section |
| 20. Inform each fighting man and commander of combat mission using political personnel, agitators, and combat activists | | Political deputies and personnel of army political section |
| 21. Check readiness and preservation of weapons, ammunition, and the fitting of uniforms and equipment | | Political deputies and personnel of army political section |

III. Work After Landing of Assault Force (in Period of Battle)

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| 23. Assist commanders in [working out] the most varied signalling methods to control the battle under nighttime conditions and mark locations of friendly troops | | Chiefs of political sections and personnel of army political section |
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| 24. Adopt all necessary measures to support evacuation of wounded, bury the dead with honors, and gather party and Komsomol documents from dead communists and Komsomols | Deputy commanders for political affairs |
| 25. Organize explanatory work among the fighting men and commanders around the letter of the army military council | Political deputies and personnel of army political section |
| 26. Organize the publicizing of men and commanders who distinguished themselves in battles through slogans, operational news sheets, and special bulletins and recommend them for government awards | Political deputies |
| 27. Adopt the most decisive measures for the collection of ammunition on the battlefield and the correct use of captured weapons; deal mercilessly with cowards and panic-mongers; immediately reward men and commanders who distinguished themselves on the battlefield | Commanders and political deputies |
| 28. Relying on communists and combat activists, mobilize the personnel for the unconditional consolidation of the captured position. Constantly feed mobilizing slogans to the fighting men: "...Give Crimea!", "Forward, Black Sea men!", "We will not disgrace the honor of our army!", "Forward against the enemy!", and so forth | Political deputies and personnel of army political section |
| 29. In the course of battle, with the loss of political personnel and party and Komsomol activists, make appointment on the spot from the reserve with subsequent submission to army political section for approval | Chiefs of political sections, political deputies, personnel of army political section |

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| 30. Ensure daily receipt of Soviet Information Bureau summaries and their presentation to the personnel | Chiefs of clubs, agitators of large units and units |
| 31. Assist the party-political apparatus of army artillery units in organizing work to ensure accomplishment of combat missions. Pay special attention to organizing coordination between artillery and infantry | Chupakhin [I. P.] |
| 32. Daily by 2000 hours, chiefs of political sections, political deputies, and personnel of army political section are to present to army political section reports on party-political work conducted and on all shortcomings in the period of preparation and conduct of the operation; use all types and means of communication for this | Chiefs of political sections, political deputies, personnel of army political section |

IV. Summing Up the Results of the Battle

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| 33. On completion of the combat operation conduct party and Komsomol meetings with reports of commanders or political deputies with agenda: "On the vanguard role of communists and Komsomols in battle and the next tasks" | Chiefs of political sections, and deputy commanders |
| 34. Assist commanders to conduct officers call with commanders of platoons, companies, battalions, regiments (separately) with critique of conducted combat operation | Chiefs of political sections, personnel of army political section |
| 35. Conduct meeting of Red Army men with critique of combat operation which has taken place and showing men and officers who distinguished themselves in battle | Commanders, political deputies |
| 36. Publish operational news sheets, on pages of which show those who distinguished themselves in battle | Editors of operational news sheets, political deputies |

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| 37. Assist commanders in drawing up materials to reward men and commanders who distinguished themselves in the accomplishment of the combat mission and presenting them with government awards | Political deputies |
| 38. Organize mass-political work with local population of liberated populated places by conducting talks on the work of our rear area and the international situation and the conduct of meetings | Political deputies |
| 39. Conduct a conference of agitators jointly with combat activists with the question: "On the tasks in consolidating the positions which have been won" | Political deputies |
| 40. Organize the preparation of reports on the atrocities [of the fascists], use these materials in agitation-propaganda work | Klyuyev |
| 41. On occupying a populated place, immediately restore organs of Soviet authority and adopt necessary measures to establish order | Chiefs of political sections, personnel of army political section |

Chief of political section
1st Army Colonel Brezhnev

FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II 1939-1945], Vol 7. Voenizdat, 1976, p 227.
2. Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, "Malaya Zemlya." Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 31.
3. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], fund 371, inventory 6386, file 18, sheets 79-82.
4. Ibid, fund 2055, inventory 1, file 65, sheet 889.
5. VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 9, 1975, p 39.
6. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945," Vol 7, p 224.

7. Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, "Malaya Zemlya," pp 23-24.

8. TsAMO SSSR, fund 371, inventory 6386, file 18, sheets 79, 80, 81, 82.

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SOVIET COMMENTS ON VIETNAM ANNIVERSARY

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 79 signed to press 23 Nov 79 pp 49-51

[Article, published under the heading "In the Fraternal Armies," by Candidate of Military Sciences Col L. Voloshin: "Guarding the Achievements of the Vietnam People for 35 Years"]

[Text] The Vietnamese Peoples Army (VNA) has inscribed a glorious page in the chronicle of the long revolutionary-liberation struggle against imperialist aggression, national oppression, neocolonialism, social injustice, and great-power expansionism.

It travelled a difficult combat path. The first subunit of the peoples forces--an armed agitation detachment which became the nucleus of the regular Vietnamese Peoples Army--was created on 22 December 1944 in the province of Caobang by a directive signed by Ho Chi Minh. It played the role of shock force of the people who rose in rebellion in the August revolution of 1945, as a result of which the first socialist state in Southeast Asia was proclaimed--the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).

Immediately after the victory of the August revolution, the Vietnamese people and their army had to defend their revolutionary achievements against the encroachments of the French colonizers (1946) who tried to smash the forces of resistance and capture the country completely.

The Vietnamese Peoples Army conducted a decisive struggle against the French aggression. In May 1954, the DRV armed forces inflicted a decisive defeat on the colonizers' troops at Dienbienphu. This victory marked the basic turning point in the course of the Vietnamese people's war of liberation and demonstrated the increased combat might of the Vietnamese Peoples Army. In the attainment of final victory over the French colonizers, it relied on comprehensive support and assistance on the part of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Under peaceful conditions, being guided by the Lenin principles for building an army of the socialist type and using the wealth of experience in the

creation of armed forces in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the 22d Plenum of the Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP) Central Committee put forth the task, in 1957, of building a truly people's regular army equipped with contemporary combat equipment and weapons and having the necessary services and combat arms. The successes attained in socialist construction contributed to the accomplishment of this important task. The armed forces were transformed into a modern army. They began to include ground forces, aviation, and a navy.

The prospects for the country's peaceful development contradicted the intentions of the United States of America. Therefore, at the beginning of the 1960's Washington, coarsely violating the Geneva agreement of 1954, initiated a "large" war in Vietnam. It decided to erect a serious obstacle in the path of further development of the national-liberation movement in Asia and, thereby, to change the correlation of forces in this area in its favor. The United States sent its expeditionary corps to South Vietnam to attain its assigned goals and undertook the mass bombing of North Vietnamese territory.

The Soviet Union and other socialist states, true to the principles of socialist internationalism, did not abandon the fraternal Vietnamese people in trouble. They not only condemned the barbarous act of the U. S. imperialists, but they also gave the heroic Vietnamese people effective economic, military, and diplomatic assistance.

The Soviet Union rendered especially significant assistance. It sent to Vietnam everything necessary to repel aggression: armament, ammunition, materiel, fuel, equipment, metal, food, and medicines. The world press repeatedly noted that approximately 70 percent of the assistance to Vietnam in the war years came from the Soviet Union.

The defenders of North Vietnam heroically repelled the U. S. aggression, and the armed forces of liberation in the southern part of the country inflicted more and more powerful strikes against the American troops and their puppets.

The Vietnamese example shows that a people who consistently struggles against imperialism and for freedom and independence and on whose side stand the Soviet Union and all the world's socialist countries as well as the peace-loving forces in the entire world is invincible.

The situation in Vietnam changed fundamentally with the liberation of the country's south. It was characterized by the transition from war to peace, from schism to the unification of north and south. The reunified country began to be called the Vietnamese Socialist Republic (July 1976).

In the accomplishment of the large-scale tasks which arose in the new stage of the country's development, an important role belonged to the Vietnamese Peoples Army. In this connection, it was stressed in the documents of the 4th Congress of the Vietnamese Workers Party (December 1976) and in the special decisions of the Central Committee and the Politburo that in the new

situation the VNA must maintain constant high combat readiness, display vigilance, steadily strengthen the country's defense, improve its organization, conduct military training, participate actively in strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat, conduct the decisive liquidation of the remnants of the Saigon army, suppress counterrevolution, and maintain order and security.

Along with the accomplishment of these important tasks, the men of the VNA took a most active part in economic construction and made a ponderable contribution to the creation of the country's material-technical base and the acceleration of socialist industrialization.

But now, serious tests awaited the Vietnamese people and their army in the future. The consistent strengthening of the positions of socialism in the SRV [Vietnamese Socialist Republic] and its basic foreign-policy course were not to the liking not only of internal reaction and imperialist circles, but also to the Beijing leadership which shifted to direct expansionist actions against heroic Vietnam.

The organization of armed clashes on the border of Cambodia and the SRV, the broad provocation campaign around the question of persons of Chinese nationality residing in Vietnam--huaqiao, the cessation of any assistance to the SRV, the increase in the scales of subversive activity against the republic, the seizure of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea which belong to Vietnam, the accomplishment of an entire series of armed provocation by the Maoists on Vietnam's northern border--all this testifies to the deliberate preparation of aggression against this country.

On 17 February, China treacherously attacked socialist Vietnam. This war thoroughly exposed the aggressive, militaristic, chauvinistic, and hegemonistic essence of Maoism, and the policy of blackmail, coercion, and dictation which it conducted in relations with neighboring countries. The aggression which was monstrous in its cynicism was a coarse violation of international law by China. It showed how irresponsible was Beijing's attitude toward the fates of the world and the criminal ease with which today's Beijing rulers put weapons into operation.

"Now all can see," said the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "that it is this policy which now is the most serious threat to peace in the entire world."*

Aggression against socialist Vietnam is the consequence of the treason of the Beijing leaders to the Marxist-Leninist teaching, the principles of proletarian internationalism, and their open change over to the side of imperialism.

* L. I. Brezhnev, "Vo imya schastiya sovetskikh lyudey" [In the Name of the Happiness of the Soviet People]. Moscow, Izvestiya, 1979, p 8.

The military adventure undertaken by the Maoists failed shamefully; the 30-day war ended with the victory of the heroic Vietnamese people and the brave VNA. They protected their socialist achievements with honor and defended the motherland's national independence and territorial integrity.

And just as formerly, in their struggle the Vietnamese people relied on the comprehensive support of the Soviet Union and the other states of the socialist commonwealth. Operating in conformance with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the SRV concluded on 3 November 1978, our country gave all necessary assistance to fighting Vietnam. The firm, consistent position of the Soviet Union which many times already had come to the aid of the Vietnamese people during their difficult years of struggle for freedom and independence again found its confirmation in practice. Vietnam is being granted comprehensive aid even now when the workers of the republic are selflessly restoring the national economy which was destroyed by the Chinese aggressors.

As the facts show, the Beijing hegemonists have not abandoned their expansionist intentions despite defeat. They are drawing up new forces on the boundaries of Vietnam, organizing armed provocations against neighboring Laos, and interfering in the internal affairs of Cambodia.

The difficult war years did not undermine the combat might of the VNA. The stages of the struggle with the imperialist and chauvinist aggressors through which it passed and the victories which were won show that it withstood the test of maturity, passed the tests of strength, and now represents experienced, organizationally strong, and well-trained armed forces.

The Vietnamese servicemen are greeting the 35th anniversary of their army with new successes in combat and political training. They fully realize and are accomplishing with honor their honorable and responsible mission--to be the guardian of the Vietnamese people's peaceful and creative labor and their revolutionary achievements, and always to be ready to stop any encroachments on the part of the imperialists and Chinese hegemonists.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: MOSCOW AIR DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

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[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Information," by Candidate of Military Sciences (Res) I. Mikhaylenko: "Organization for the Control of the VI Air Defense Fighter Corps in the Moscow Counteroffensive"]

[Text] The Headquarters, Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] committed the following in the Moscow counteroffensive along with the troops of the Kalinin, Western, and the right wing of the Southwestern Fronts: the aircraft of the Moscow Defense Zone, two air reserve groups of the Supreme High Command [SHC], and large units of long-range bomber aviation and VI Air Defense [AD] Fighter Corps (commander Colonel I. D. Klimov, chief of staff Colonel I. I. Komarov) which was operationally subordinate to the commander of the Moscow AD Corps Area, Major General of Artillery D. A. Zhuravlev.

Coordination of the operations of all air forces was assigned to the commander of the Air Force [VVS] of the Soviet Army, Lieutenant General of Aviation P. F. Zhigarev.

The German-fascist forces were superior to the Soviet forces in manpower, artillery, and tanks. And only in aviation did we have a 1.6-fold superiority (Army Group "Center" had 615 airplanes while the Soviet VVS numbered 1,000 airplanes), and the number of new types of aircraft in the front aviation of the western direction reached 47.5 percent.¹

The main role in the destruction of the enemy striking forces was allotted to the Western Front in whose zone operated 80 percent of all the aviation concentrated in the Moscow area² (also including VI AD Fighter Corps).

VI AD Fighter Corps accomplished the following combat missions in the offensive together with the VVS of the Western Front: It maintained air supremacy, supported and covered the ground forces, launched ground attack strikes against enemy troops and combat equipment, accompanied bombers and ground attack aircraft, and defended the front rear area against air strikes. However, the air corps' primary mission was ensuring the air defense of the

capital and the installations of the Moscow industrial area. Where necessary, all fighters were to participate in defeating enemy air strikes in accordance with the plan and concept of the commander of the Moscow AD Corps Area. This was the special feature in employing the VI AD Fighter Corps in the counteroffensive.

The Soviet Air Force won operational air supremacy as early as the end of the defensive period in the Battle of Moscow. Concentrating about 1,000 airplanes (of them, more than 600 in the VI AD Fighter Corps), Hq SHC created numerical air superiority over the enemy. On its instructions, from 11 through 18 October and from 5 through 8 November two air operations were conducted to destroy the enemy air force on its airfields. More than 660 airplanes were destroyed and damaged.³

As a result, the enemy redeployed his aviation at airfields more distant from the front line, reducing the intensity of his operations in the period of the counteroffensive by the Soviet troops.

The maintenance of air supremacy was assigned basically to the VI AD Fighter Corps. It accomplished it in the course of accomplishing the missions previously listed in coordination with antiaircraft artillery and the other arms and services.

Control of the combat operations of the VI AD Fighter Corps was centralized and accomplished from the command post (CP) of the Moscow AD Corps Area where the commander and operations group of the headquarters, VI Fighter Aviation Corps, were also located.

In organizing the covering of the troops and installations of the front rear area, plans for the coordination of the AD men and equipment were worked out in conjunction with the staffs of fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery ahead of time and were brought to the attention of all coordinating units.

The basis of the decision for the air defense of the installations was formed by the idea of creating an all-around, echeloned defense with its reinforcement on the most important directions and with the close coordination of all combat arms. The structure of the defense of the installations was determined by the place and role of each of them.

The beginning of the transition from the objective to zonal-objective structuring of the defense, where a single grouping of AD forces covered a number of installations disposed on a vast territory, took place back in the defensive period of operations. The maneuver capabilities of the fighter aviation were considered here.

On order of the commander of the Moscow Corps Area, the commander and staff of the air corps organized a system of posts for guidance to aerial targets. They were based on VNOS [air warning] posts which were equipped with radios for communications with the fighters and with direct telephone and radio

communication with the air corps CP. Guidance was accomplished by officers who were detailed to these posts from the air regiments.

The corps headquarters received information about the aerial situation from the VNOS service and the radar of the air regiments. Data from the main VNOS post and radar were processed and plotted on a map. The navigator of the air corps, Major P. P. Mashen'kin, performed the necessary calculations for each target. The chief of staff reported the situation and recommendations to the commander of the air corps who made his decision and issued an oral combat order. Indicated in it were: the numbers of the air regiments, the number of fighters to take off, flight route and altitude, time of arrival at the target, and mission. Officer guides transmitted the air corps commander's order to the air regiment CPs by telephone.

Telephone communication was the basic type of command communication for the air corps. The means for controlling the air squadrons in the air were radio, change of aircraft attitude, and signal flares. RS1-3 radios permitted maintaining communication within a radius of 70-80 kilometers, which hindered control of the fighters during operations at their complete tactical radius.

The covering of troops and front rear-area objectives by the forces of the Moscow AD Corps Area, in particular by fighter air units of the VI AD Fighter Corps, was a forced measure since the fronts had an insignificant amount of antiaircraft artillery. For example, at the end of November 1941 the Western Front had an average of only 23 antiaircraft guns per combined-arms army.⁴

Because of a shortage of radars in the AD units, it was necessary to accomplish this mission by patrolling in the air on which a large quantity of fuel and motor capacity were expended. Landing fields were constructed 10-15 kilometers from the front line for operations from ambushes. The AD fighters, being in the ambushes, took off only after visual detection of the enemy which did not always provide favorable results in the fight with reconnaissance aircraft and high-speed bombers.

In the accomplishment of combat missions to cover the troops and objectives in the front rear area, the combat formation of the air flight was organized from the combat formations of pairs ("pair front," "pair echelon"). The squadron combat formation consisted of the combat formations of pairs and flights and was subdivided into groups--strike and covering. Here, the covering group usually included new types of high-speed airplanes (YaK-1, MIG-3, LAGG-3) while the strike group included obsolete airplanes (I-16, I-153). The combat formation of the fighter regiment was formed from three groups: strike, covering, and support. In covering objectives, the fighters were echeloned in altitude more and more often. Air regiment commanders were forced to orient the pilots on a maneuver in a horizontal plane since the I-16 and I-153 had a shorter turning radius and time for a banked turn and were inferior to the Germans in rate of climb. The organization of coordination between the fighter aviation and the antiaircraft artillery of the fronts

and AD fighters when covering troops and objectives in the front rear area was structured in accordance with the principle of the division of battle zones. Troop antiaircraft artillery and front fighters operated as if in the first echelon, while the fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery of the National Air Defense were in the second echelon (fighter aviation operated on the distant approaches to the objectives while antiaircraft artillery operated on the near approaches and above the objectives). Thus, the enemy bombers were subjected to successive strikes on several lines.

On the whole, our aviation successfully defended the troops and front installations against air strikes and maintained air supremacy in the course of the counteroffensive. For example, from 17 through 24 December German aviation accomplished up to 300 overflights in the zone of three fronts. Our aviation accomplished 3,200 air sorties.⁵

AD fighters were committed not only to cover the troops and to protect the installations in the front rear area from air strikes, but also to support the attacking large units of the Western Front. On the first day of the counteroffensive alone, the air units of the VI AD Fighter Corps accomplished up to 2,000 air sorties.⁶ The air regiments of the VI AD Fighter Corps accomplished their biggest ground attack operations on 5-7 December when they launched air strikes against enemy troops in the area of Krasnaya Polyana, Belyy Rast, Kamenka, and Kochergino. During this time, the air corps accomplished up to 700 sorties for ground attack operations alone. Sixty-three tanks, 519 vehicles, 71 vans with infantry, and 6 tank trucks were destroyed, 43 antiaircraft-machinegun and 19 antiaircraft artillery nests were neutralized, and a significant number of infantry were scattered.⁶

Ground attack strikes against the retreating enemy proved to be especially effective. The deep snow mantle immobilized the enemy's maneuver. The German-fascist troops had to move over roads choked with the trains of the rear-services units. The Soviet air command considered this. The main efforts of the aviation were concentrated for strikes on the enemy columns. On 9 and 11 December the units of the VI AD Fighter Corps accomplished 300 sorties to destroy the retreating enemy columns in the area of Nudol', Rumyantsevo Station, and Novo-Petrovskiy. On 13 and 14 December, units of the corps accomplished 300 sorties, launching strikes against the enemy who was retreating from Klin and Solnechnogorsk. On these days 22 tanks, 479 vehicles, 21 vans, 120 wagons, 43 machinegun nests, and a considerable number of personnel were destroyed.⁹ Lieutenant V. Ye. Kovalev, Senior Lieutenant N. S. Samokhvalov, Captain A. I. Smirnov, and many others were pilots who distinguished themselves when launching the ground-attack strikes.

The support of the ground forces was accomplished by units of the VI AD Fighter Corps on the basis of instructions of the Western Front commander and the decision of the commander of the Moscow AD Corps Area. Units of the corps operated in accordance with the plans of the Western Front's VVS headquarters. Control of the air regiments was also centralized. Guidance of the fighters to the targets was accomplished from guidance posts of the

Western Front's VVS out to which air representatives of the VI AD Fighter Corps were sent.

The role of the air corps' staff as a control element consisted of its providing the commander with all necessary data (reports, calculations) in making an estimate of the situation and making a decision, planning combat operations for each day, organizing the basic types of support, quickly informing the commanders of the air regiments of the air corps commander's decision, checking the accomplishment of combat missions, organizing control posts on AD airfields which were previously occupied by units of the air corps and which had been liberated from the enemy, organizing continuous communications, working out measures for secret control, following the accomplishment of measures directed toward raising combat readiness, and accomplishing other missions on the order of the air corps commander.

Instructions on the coordination of the aviation with the ground forces also came from the commanders of the Western Front and the Moscow AD Corps Area. The immediate organizers of coordination were the commander and staff of the air corps. They defined in detail questions of combat operations in the accomplishment of joint combat missions with frontal aviation and coordinated the efforts of the fighters with the ground forces for place, time, and target. Unfortunately, no coordination plans (coordination planning tables) were prepared. The missions of the air regiments, time for launching fighter ground attack strikes against enemy ground objectives, the procedure to call for air support and assign it missions, signals for mutual identification, marking the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), target indication, and other questions were reflected in combat orders (instructions) and refined on the spot with the personal contact of combined-arms and air commanders or through air representatives who were with the combined-arms (tank) large units. To ensure close coordination with the attacking rifle units, the command of the VI AD Fighter Corps detailed several operations groups headed by responsible corps staff officers. These groups were in the troop combat formations and, in the course of battle, ensured coordination with the ground forces and maintained close contact with the Western Front VVS. In the AD forces, this was the first experience in employing such operations groups which performed the functions of intermediate control elements.

But there also were serious shortcomings in the questions of coordination between the VI AD Fighter Corps and the ground forces. Because of a lack of reliable means for target indication and guidance, the air subunits and units operated at a considerable distance from the FEBA for fear of hitting friendly troops. The attacking troops could not exploit the results of the ground attack strikes by the fighters at once, as a result of which the effectiveness of the air strikes was reduced.

Some air regimental commanders did not establish contact with the combined-arms commanders, did not establish communications with them, did not have sufficient knowledge of the ground situation, and could not react quickly to changes in it. In a number of cases, the ground forces were left without air

support at the most crucial moments of the battle. The combined-arms commanders assigned missions to the fliers vaguely and unclearly. In addition, the rifle units had not studied the silhouettes of friendly aircraft very well and often fired on them nor were they able to mark the front line and indicate targets on the battlefield. As a rule, the air regimental commanders directed their units from the command post of the airfield where the fighters were based. Despite the shortcomings which were present, the VI AD Fighter Corps played a significant role in fighting the ground enemy.

AD fighters were used to escort bombers and attack aircraft. Since they were based separately from the latter, the rendezvous time and place were coordinated ahead of time by the staffs of the cooperating air units. Escorting was begun most often from the fighter airfield over which the bombers made a circle or a planned loop, thereby giving the fighters the opportunity to join up with them. The planning table which was drawn up by the staff of the Western Front's VVS was an organizing document and represented a schedule of operations for each of the groups by stages of flight. Moreover, the staffs of the bomber divisions and the fighter regiments worked out tables of communication signals. Control of the fighters from the ground was accomplished from the CPs of the air units during takeoff and landing. In the air, it was accomplished by subunit commanders using radio, aircraft attitude changes in flight, and firing colored flares and machinegun bursts.

In January 1942, in connection with the advance of the Soviet troops to the west, the VI AD Fighter Corps could not give them substantial assistance as it remained in the Moscow area. Our air force no longer had numerical superiority over the enemy. As a result, air supremacy was gradually lost on the western direction. The redeployment of the air regiments of the VI AD Fighter Corps to the west inevitably would lead to a weakening of Moscow's air defense system, and the threat of an air attack on the capital by the German 2d Air Force continued to remain a reality. Enemy aviation undertook several attempts to launch an air strike on Moscow in January 1942, and during the first three months of 1942 1,100 overflights by enemy airplanes were noted within the boundaries of the Moscow AD Corps Area.¹⁰ In repelling the raids on Moscow, the AD units destroyed 155 enemy airplanes.¹¹

The experience of employing the National Air Defense Forces, in particular fighter aviation, in the Moscow counteroffensive was widely used in the subsequent offensive operations of the Soviet troops. It was a new phenomenon in Soviet military art. In organizing an offensive, Hq SHC always looked for the opportunity to commit large AD forces and weapons not so much to cover and support the ground troops as to accomplish the air defense of the communications and various installations of the front rear area, thereby giving the troop air defense the opportunity to concentrate efforts on covering the main ground-force groupings against air strikes.

The experience in employing AD fighter aviation in the Battle of Moscow showed the expediency of subordinating air units and large units which accomplished the air defense mission completely to the commander of the National Air Defense Forces as was done in accordance with the order of the Soviet

Peoples Commissariat of Defense of 22 January 1942. In using AD fighter aviation in subsequent offensive operations control of the air units was accomplished not only from the airfield at which the planes were based, but also using operations groups consisting of staff officers from the AD air divisions.

The sending of air representatives to the antiaircraft units to maintain coordination with them subsequently became widespread.

The main directions in which the leadership of AD aviation was developed and improved was increasing flexibility and ensuring the stability and continuity of control. This was attained by creating a reliable system of control posts which used radio communications, by planning combat operations ahead of time, by maintaining continuous contact with the control elements of the fronts' fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery, and by organizing the clear work of commanders and staffs of air large units in the control of the fighters' combat operations.

The employment of AD fighter aviation in the Moscow counteroffensive showed with all obviousness the significance of radio and radar for the control and guidance of fighters to aerial and ground targets. As a result, in April 1942 the headquarters of the National Air Defense Forces issued official instructions on organizing the guidance of fighter aviation using the RUS-2.¹² With the arrival of a sufficient quantity of radars in the AD fighter units, the trend toward abandoning constant patrolling in the air by fighters was noted as was the transition to the accomplishment of a combat mission from the "airfield alert" status. Patrolling began to be considered most efficient only in the air defense of objectives located at a short distance from the front line and under conditions where there were not enough radars in the units. But the status of the material base permitted increasing the number of sorties from the "airfield alert" status in 1942 only to 16.3 percent as opposed to 3.4 percent in 1941.¹³

In subsequent strategic offensive operations, when big large units of the National Air Defense Forces were operating in the zone of a front, much more attention was devoted to questions of planning and the organization of coordination. An indispensable condition was the preparation of plans for the combat employment of aviation and plans (planning tables) for coordination between the staffs of the fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery of the fronts and the large units (formations) of the National Air Defense Forces.

FOOTNOTES

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2. Ibid, p 281.

3. M. N. Kozhevnikov, "Komandovaniye i shtab VVS Sovetskoy Armii v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945" [The Command and Staff of the Soviet Army's Air Force in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945], Moscow, Nauka, 1977, pp 63, 64, 67.
4. N. A. Svetlishin, "Voyska PVO strany v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [The National Air Defense Forces in the Great Patriotic War], Voenizdat, 1979, p 55.
5. "Sovetskiye Voenno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1944" [Soviet Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1944], Voenizdat, 1968, p 86.
6. D. A. Zhuravlev, "Ognevoy shchit Moskvy" [Moscow's Shield of Fire], Voenizdat, 1968, p 98.
8. TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], fund 71, inventory 708648, file 1, sheets 120-121.
9. Ibid.
10. N. A. Svetlishin, "Voyska PVO strany v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne," p 61.
11. TsAMO, fund 218, inventory 198982, file 13, sheets 1, 15, 33.
12. Ibid, fund 217, inventory 1240, file 5, sheet 141.
13. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 6, 1974, p 28

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FRUNZE MILITARY ACADEMY: WARFARE HISTOR INSTRUCTION

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[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Information," by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences Colonel I. Kartavtsev: "Teaching the History of the Art of Warfare in the Frunze Military Academy During the Period 1918-1978"]

[Text] The history of military art was included in the program of instruction for students at the Frunze Academy from the day of its founding. In 1918, nine percent of the total training time budget was allotted to it.¹ The basic type of lesson was lectures which were given by experienced instructors--former generals and officers who had completed the Nikolayevskaya Academy of the General Staff (some of them taught in it). The chief leader of the subject was Professor A. A. Svechin. Lectures were often given in a discussion format (reading from a text was considered impermissible), and the instructor answered the rejoinder of a doubter without delay. But far from all students were able to abstract and study the literature independently. Therefore, after giving the lecture they issued an abbreviated version of it which was printed on a printing press.

In the 1919/20 training year, the time for the study of military-history disciplines was doubled--from 56 to 110 hours. Of them, 30 were allotted for the study of the history of military art, and 60--for the study of the history of war (20 hours each on the Franco-Prussian, Russo-Japanese, and **First** World Wars) in the senior course.

Beginning with 1919, survey reports by representatives of the RVSR [Republic Revolutionary Military Council] field headquarters on operations of the Civil War were practiced occasionally.

With the academy's change over to the three-year instruction period in 1920, graduation theses on a military-historical subject were introduced for students of the so-called additional (third) course, while the more systematic giving of lectures on the Civil War (up to 30 hours) was introduced for the senior (second) course. In the 1921/22 training year, military-history

disciplines were divided into two cycles: the history of military art and the history of recent wars. Two hundred hours were allotted to them (not considering the time for working out the thesis subject).

The program of the first cycle (general history of military art, history of Russia's military art, and new history) was designed for 90 hours and was studied in the junior (first) course. The program of the second cycle was designed for 110 hours, including the study of four wars: the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the World War of 1914-1918, and the Civil War. In this regard, 80 percent of the time in the training program for the senior (second) course was allotted to the last two wars.

In comparison with the preceding year, in the 1921/22 training year a new history and the history of Russian military art were singled out in the general course of military-historical disciplines. The time for the history of the Civil War was more than tripled.

For the deeper mastery of the Civil War's combat experience, in the 1922/23 training year the history cycle of recent wars was divided into two departments: the history of the World War (senior leader A. M. Zayonchkovskiy, and after his death in 1926--A. S. Beloy), and the history of the Civil War (senior leader N. Ye. Kakurin). Lectures on the Franco-Prussian and Russo-Japanese Wars were excluded from the program.

Post-graduate work was introduced in the academy on 29 February 1924. The first post-graduate student in military history was V. A. Melikov who subsequently became an important scientist. However, the systematic training of military historians could not be organized through the post-graduate program because it proved impossible to man the staff completely.

In the same year, on the instruction of M. V. Frunze the program for studying the history of the Civil War was expanded by 50 percent. The students of the second course began to study a number of subjects, primarily tactical, from the experience of the First World and Civil Wars by the seminar method.

The conversion of the supplementary course into the third course of the main faculty in 1925 made it possible to distribute the entire academic program among three courses more expediently.²

In 1926, all three military-history departments were combined in the military-history cycle, which contributed to the better coordination of their work.

In the 1926/27 training year, 365 hours were allotted for military-history disciplines in the main faculty.

In 1934, military-history field trips³ which were organized at the end of camp assemblies of the second and third classes were introduced as one of the forms of instructing the students.

In 1935, subjects in military history began to be studied in classrooms with the use of maps and diagrams. Such lessons received the name of group lessons. They had an applied nature since the basic types of combat operations of corps and divisions from the experience of the World and Civil Wars were examined on them.

In the 1934/35 training year, 300 hours were allotted to the study of disciplines of the military-history cycle, and in the next year--360 hours, in which regard up to 50 percent of the entire time budget was for the department of the history of the Civil War.⁴

A new feature in the study of the history of military art in the 1935/36 training year was the fact that the students of the main faculty worked out 15 thesis subjects with the use of sources in foreign languages.

Altogether, 35 thesis subjects were offered on the history of the Civil War. Here are some of them: "How the control of the armies of the Western Front should have been organized in the second half of August 1920," "Was the Civil War of 1918-1920 a war of the Red Army with inverted bases," and others. All this shows that thesis subject matter bore an exceptionally creative nature.

As the program in military-history instruction expanded, the shortage of highly-qualified teachers was felt more and more acutely. Therefore, from 1 September 1935 military-history courses were included as part of the academy with the rights of a faculty⁵ at which teachers capable of the successful instruction of students in military-history disciplines were trained. It should be noted that the program of instruction was very laborious. This is shown convincingly, for example, by the scale of the military-history trips and the subject matter of the group lessons.

Thus, near Zhitomir, in the area of the camp assembly for students of the second course, a military-history trip was organized on the subject, "The breakthrough of the 1st Cavalry Army in 1920," and with the third course in the area of Borisov--on the subject, "The Berezino battle in 1920," and directly on the Perekop Isthmus--"Wrangel and his liquidation." Participants in the combat operations on both sides, including former White Guards generals amnestied by Soviet authority, were used to conduct the military-history trips.

With the combined training of the students in a moving train (special train) the military-history cycle organized interesting lessons on the actual terrain on the subjects: "Vолоchayevka operation," "Chita operation," "Fighting the British interventionists in Turkestan (Kaakhka-Dushak, Kyzyl-Arvat, Krasnovodsk)."⁶

The military-history trips were of considerable value to the students. They helped them to master the experience of the last war better. The trips always ended with exciting meetings with heroes of the Civil War, soviet and party leaders, and a brilliant manifestation of the unity of the army and the

people. All this furthered the successful indoctrination of commanders in revolutionary and combat traditions.

Strained and instructive also were the group lessons on maps which were conducted, for example, on such subjects as: "The meeting engagement of the 25th Rifle Division in the Buguruslan-Belebey operation;" "The 27th Infantry Division breaking out of encirclement in 1920;" "The attack of the 11th Petrograd Division on 4 July 1920;" and "The preparation of the Buguruslan-Belebey operation (basic measures of M. V. Frunze)." Three hours were allotted to each subject, and 66 hours altogether for group lessons for the Civil War department.

In 1938, 400 hours--12 percent of the entire training time budget--were allotted for the study of the history of wars and military art.

The military-history disciplines were distributed among the courses of instruction in the following manner: first course--the history of military art; second course--history of World War I; third course--the history of the Civil War in the USSR; the history of recent wars (from the Greek-Turkish War to the intervention in Spain and China inclusively)⁷.

The following types of lessons were employed in the departments of the military-history cycle: lectures, seminars, military-history trips and excursions.

Interviews and check work without assigning a grade were practiced (no more often than once a trimester)⁸. The interviews had the nature of oral tests on the material studied, while the check work was a written statement of the students' answers on the same questions (sometimes, in the form of diagrams or tables).

Thus, the forms of the check were: a check of knowledge on seminar (group) lessons, tests, abstracts, and graduation theses. The latter two forms were extended to a limited group of students who had accomplished abstracts in the first course and graduation theses in the third course (altogether, up to 50 thesis subjects). Examinations were also conducted in the main and intelligence faculties: in the second course--on the history of World War I, and in the third--on the history of the Civil War.⁹

The department on the history of the first and second imperialist wars was created at the beginning of 1941 (instead of the department of the world imperialist war and the department of recent wars). But it also underwent change soon. With the start of the Great Patriotic War all training programs were quickly reworked and the academy changed over to an abbreviated course of instruction. All the military-history departments were combined into one headed by Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor and Lieutenant General A. K. Kolenkovskiy. The students were now taught only what was needed at the front, that is, primarily competent commanders of the tactical echelon were trained. The lecture course on the history of military art was revised so as to show from the experience of the First and Civil Wars the most instructive battles

and operations which were similar to contemporary ones (in particular, in the employment of tanks and artillery). Simultaneously, important work was conducted on the generalization and introduction of the war's experience in the training process. Having limited material, the collective of the military department was able to generalize the experience of a number of 1941 operations without delay (Moscow, Tula, Yelets, and Tikhvin operations) and to draw conclusions.

In the summer of 1943, the academy again changed over to a three-year course of instruction. According to the new manning tables of 1945-1946, the military-history cycle included three departments: the history of military art (chief Major General B. S. Antropov), the history of Russian military art (chief Major General B. I. Kuznetsov), and the history of Soviet military art (chief Lieutenant General V. F. Vorob'yev from March 1946). Two of these three departments remained in 1946. The cycle of military history disciplines was abolished. The basic subjects of the department of Russian military art became a component part of the program of the department of the history of military art (chief General B. I. Kuznetsov, from 1948--Colonel Ye. A. Razin). As formerly, the department of the history of Soviet military art was headed by General V. F. Vorob'yev.

In each of the departments two or three sectors were distinguished which included teachers who specialized in the history of one or another stage in the development of military art (Russian military art, the military art of the capitalist countries, and so forth).

The history of military art from ancient times to World War I of 1914-1918 inclusively was studied in the first course. Operations of World War I were examined in greatest detail.

Problems in the creation of the Red Army, Soviet military art in the years of the Civil War, and its development in the interwar period (1922-1941) were studied in the second course.

The students of the third course, in essence, studied Soviet military art in the years of the Great Patriotic War.

In connection with the fact that in the Soviet Army important work was initiated on the study of the experience of the Great Patriotic War, in the spring of 1946 a military history faculty was opened in the academy. Officers having a higher military or pedagogical education were instructed in it for two years. Altogether, by the time it was disbanded in 1956 the military history faculty had trained up to 400 military historians.

The training of teachers was renewed in 1948 through post-graduate work in the military history departments for which the most capable and promising officers from among the graduates of the military history faculty were selected.

In 1947, military-history field trips for students of the military history faculty were revived on a new, more contemporary basis, first to the sites of battles near Moscow, and subsequently these lessons began to be conducted in the areas of Stalingrad, Kursk, Korsun-Shevchenko, in Belorussia, and in other places.

From 1948, on order of the Minister of the Armed Forces USSR the number of lectures on the history of military art of the pre-Soviet period was reduced and subject matter on the Great Patriotic War was expanded. This decision was adopted for the more complete use of the experience in the last war in training officers. Altogether, 342 hours were allotted to the history of military art.

At the beginning of 1950, the two military history departments were combined into one in connection with a reduction in the program--the department of the history of military art (chief Lieutenant General V. F. Vorob'yev). A standard program for the course in the history of military art was introduced after two years. Two hundred and fifty hours were allotted to its study; of them 24 hours were allotted to a military history trip on the subject, "The Battle of Stalingrad," with up to 10 hours for assimilating the initial period of the war. Subjects on the development of military art in 1945-1953 were introduced (altogether 14 hours).

In 1952, group map lessons were organized again following the experience of the 1930's along with lectures and seminars. At first, they had the goal of a deeper study of tactics. However, it was soon learned that it is better to study the tactics of combined-arms combat in association with an army operation.

The 1960's and especially the 1970's are characterized by the extremely intensive use of motion pictures in the training process. A documentary film on the Great Patriotic War and film strips were shown.

During these years, a considerable amount of time was allotted to the study of weapons of mass destruction which inevitably entailed a reduction in the training programs to include the history of military art and the subject matter of the Great Patriotic War.

The study of the history of military art in the first course in the 1974/75 training year ended with a seminar on the development of Soviet military art in the first period of the Great Patriotic War and with the conduct of a military-history trip to the battle sites at Moscow. The second course studied the most important operations and the development of military art in the second and third periods of the Great Patriotic War (up to the Berlin operation). A military-history trip was conducted at the end of the training year. The students of the third course studied primarily subjects on the history of the development of military art in the course of the Great Patriotic War and in the postwar period. Recent lectures on historical subject matter closed in on contemporaneity, which helped the students to solve problems in operational-tactical disciplines intelligently. The showing of documentary

films was employed more and more widely in training and indoctrinational work among the students. In preparing graduation theses, documents from the Central Archives of the Soviet Ministry of Defense on front and army operations of the Great Patriotic War were used in the majority of cases.

From 1975, the study of the history of military art began to be ended in the second course by an examination. Tests were introduced in the first course.

The 60-year experience in teaching the history of military art in the Frunze Military Academy shows that despite the change in the names of the military history disciplines, the students studied primarily the military art of the last three or four wars. During the last period, the proportion of the history of military art in the total budget of training time inevitably was either reduced or increased.

The expansion of the subject matter was usually dictated by the necessity to study new wars, for example recent local wars in the Near East. As a rule, the introduction of new subjects was accomplished with the start of the new training year, which ensured the proper scientific level of instruction.

On the whole, the study of the history of military art expanded the military horizon of the officers, armed them with experience, and contributed to the deep understanding of the contemporary principles of strategy, operational art, and tactics and the principles for the organization of the army and training of the troops.

FOOTNOTES

1. In 1918-1920 the instruction of the students in the academy lasted for less than a year (4-6 months). There were no departments and sections in the academy.
2. Formerly, the supplementary course copied the similar course of the former Nikolayevskaya Academy of the General Staff during which the student worked and defended three subjects--military history, strategic, and tactical.
3. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], fund 24695, inventory 1, file 114, sheet 52.
4. Ibid, file 113, sheet 52.
5. In December 1936 the military history faculty was transferred as part of the newly formed General Staff Academy of the Workers and Peasants Red Army.
6. TsGASA, fund 24696, inventory 1, file 114, sheet 57.
7. Ibid, file 127, sheet 37.

8. From 1933, the academic training year was divided into two periods: summer--of one trimester (May-June), and winter--of two trimesters (October-December and January-April). Twice a year, the students were granted vacations of two months in all.

9. TsGASA, fund 24696, inventory 1, file 134, sheet 82.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENSE: WORK OF CENTRAL ARCHIVES DESCRIBED

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[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Information," by Maj Gen I. Lutsev, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Archives: "About the Work of the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Archives"]

[Text] Thirty-four years have passed since the end of the Great Patriotic War. The cities and villages healed their wounds long ago. But there is an institution in our country where people come in contact with the past war every day. It is the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Archives--one of the biggest archive institutions in the country. It is located in the Moscow suburban city of Podol'sk.

The archive files are stored on the shelves of the well-built repository in special boxes in accordance with a rigidly thought-out system. They number up to 20 million, more than half for the period of the Great Patriotic War.

In 1947 the TsAMO SSSR [USSR Ministry of Defense Central Archives] was granted the right to answer the inquiries of citizens, troop units and installation, and party and state organs. Researchers received access to the archive documents.

Millions of Soviet people whose fates were touched by the war continuously turn here with the most varied questions: about confirmation of service and decorations, about wounds and concussions, about establishing the fate of relatives and close ones, about a period of service in the active army, and so forth. Altogether since 1947, more than 15 million inquiries have been satisfied by the archives.

The number of letters and inquiries is not decreasing with the years. Their flow to the archives increases on the eve of important dates in the life of our country and the army. Thus, for example, the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the Victory in 1975 enlivened significantly the work of Komsomol and pioneer search detachments, stirred the memory of frontline

veterans, and gave a new creative impulse to journalists, writers, and scientists.

Each day more than 2,500 letters and inquiries reach the archives now. The most experienced coworkers who know well the history of the Great Patriotic War, the organizational structure of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the composition and contents of the documents are involved in the work with them. Many of them passed through the severe school of war. It is necessary to look through several dozen files and study and analyze hundreds of documents on an entire series of requests.

The striving of the coworkers in the archives to answer a letter which has been received is constant. We answer the most urgent ones in 10 days while the time to accomplish the others does not exceed a month, as a rule. But recently, unfortunately, the answers to the letters are being delayed due to the sharp increase in correspondence.

People not only write to the archives, but they also visit them themselves. Each day 60-80 people visit the waiting room (chief Colonel (Retired) Stepan Yevdokimovich Maksayev, veteran of the Armed Forces, and participant in battles on the Karelian Front), and some days more than 100 of them come. In January-May of this year alone, it was visited by more than 8,000 people who submitted more than 10,000 inquiries.

The mission of the archives is not only to store, but also to organize the broad use of archive documents in the interests of the development of military-history science, to propagandize the mass heroism of the Soviet people in the war years, to expose the falsifiers of history, and to indoctrinate our people in a military-patriotic and international spirit.

The documents of the archives have been attracting the attention of researchers for a long time. The reading room is located in a new building, in light and comfortable premises. There is a hotel and a dining room.

In the reading room one can encounter a marshal and general, officer and sergeant, writer and cinema playwright, journalist and scientific associate. The following have worked on their memoirs here: Marshals of the Soviet Union S. S. Biryuzov, S. M. Budennyi, A. A. Grechko, F. I. Golikov, A. I. Yermenko, G. K. Zhukov, I. S. Konev, R. Ya. Malinovskiy, K. S. Moskalenko, K. K. Rokossovskiy, and V. D. Sokolovskiy, Chief Marshal of Aviation A. Ye. Golovanov, Army Generals S. M. Shtemenko, D. D. Lelyushenko, and others.

Each day 50-60 people work in the reading room. Altogether, since 1947 more than a million and a half archive files have been investigated.

The reading room has been headed for many years by the veteran of the archives, senior scientific fellow V. A. Kemenova. She is helped in her work by N. F. Rusetskaya, V. S. Yakovleva, Ye. A. Korenyak, R. A. Sokolova, O. V. Orlova, and others.

Party, Komsomol, and trade union organizations are conducting important work in mobilizing the personnel for the accomplishment of the missions facing the archives.

Many significant works on the history of the Great Patriotic War have been written on the basis of archive documents, including the 6-volume "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuz 1941-1945" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945], the 12-volume work "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna 1939-1945" [The Second World War 1939-1945], "Sovetskaya Voenaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], and various monographs devoted to battles and operations of the Great Patriotic War.

To render practical assistance to staffs, military-educational institutions, and troop units in the study of the war's experience the archives have prepared and professionally printed 49 collections of combat documents and produced 35 microfilms on the basic operations of the Great Patriotic War and the combat employment of tank and air armies.

The archives have created dozens of microfilms on joint combat operations of the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania and on rendering comprehensive assistance to the peoples of these countries in the years of the struggle against fascist Germany.

Many archive documents which characterize the liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces and the skill, heroism, and bravery of our servicemen have been published on the pages of the journals **KOMMUNIST**, **VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL**, and **SOVETSKIYE ARKHIVY**.

Active participation in the publication of the documents is being taken by Colonel A. Kh. Fayzulin, Lieutenant Colonel V. I. Kovalev, and senior scientific associates A. V. Zhirkov, V. V. Tarakanov, P. Ya. Dobrevol'skiy, N. P. Abramova, V. A. Sutulev, G. I. Larionov, and others. Lieutenant Colonels S. P. Lazutkin and N. G. Yankevich and senior scientific associates I. P. Kremer and G. I. Solodkov are helping in the preparation of materials for the publication of the "Soviet Military Encyclopedia."

Many documents were created under field conditions, made on low-quality paper, and written in pencil. Associates of the archives are applying much effort to preserve them as long as possible--they are restoring them in good time and creating an insurance fund. Two thousand five hundred files have undergone scientific-technical processing, new inventories of them were prepared, and 313,000 have been restored and rebound.

For important work in systematizing and organizing the storage of documents on the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 and active participation in military-history studies, the archives were awarded the Certificate of Honor of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in 1975. This year, it has been awarded the honored title of "Collective of High Labor Style."

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BOOK REVIEW: RED ARMY FRONT-COMMAND DIRECTIVES

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[Book review by Professor and Doctor of Historical Sciences Ya. Zimin: "Directives of the Red Army Front Commands"]

[Text] The fourth and concluding volume of the four-volume series of documents of the Red Army front commands for the entire period of the 1917-1922 Civil War has been published.¹ It contains materials, indexes, and reference data for all four volumes of this series as well as for the collection of Directives of the Red Army Main Command for the years 1917-1922.² This publication is a unique documentary series which permits a comprehensive study of the Soviet Armed Forces' organizational development and the development of Soviet military art at the initial stage of their history.

A special place in the volume is allotted to documents on the combat and numerical composition of the country's Armed Forces for 1918-1922 and on the number of communists, the results of party mobilizations, and the training of Red Army reserves. They comprise approximately 50 percent of all materials. The collection opens with a table of the combat and numerical composition of the revolutionary troops which operated against Kaledin and the bourgeois Central Rada in January 1918, the total strength of which did not exceed 17,000 men (documents 1, 2). The increase in the number of troops and the armament of the Red Army is evident from subsequent documents. There were no more than 29,000 men in its ranks at the approaches to Petrograd, on the Pskov direction, and in Belorussia at the beginning of March 1918 (documents 3, 4, 5). The reinforcing of the republic's defensive capability which was begun on V. I. Lenin's instruction was manifested in an increase in the numerical strength of the army and navy. Thus, already by 20 April 1918 their ranks numbered 195,838 men (document 16), by 1 December--257,730, by the second half of January 1919--788,315, by 1 December 1919--3 million, and by 1 November 1920--5,427,273 (documents 13, 15, 27, 41).

In bringing the documents to light for the collection, the compilers corrected them, supplied them with explanations, and introduced clarity in some of them (document 17). The first section of the volume provides a complete

representation of the combat and numerical composition of the Red Army at all stages of the Civil War and shows the results of the struggle of the Communist Party, headed by V. I. Lenin, for the creation of a combat-effective Red Army.

The documents of the second section disclose the number of communists and political personnel in the army and navy and show the results of the party mobilizations conducted by the Central Committee of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)]. They create a dynamic picture of the growth in the Red Army's party ranks (documents 48, 50, 53). From December 1918 through 15 August 1920, 20,838 political workers were sent to the front by the Political Directorate of the RVSR [Republic Revolutionary Military Council] alone. According to data for 1 August 1920, there were 120,185 communists united in 2,962 party cells in the active armies and flotillas. By the end of the Civil War, the number of party cells reached 7,000, and the number of communists reached 300,000 (document 52).

The third section contains materials on call-ups to the Red Army and demobilization from its ranks (documents 66-74) and on human reserves in the combat and reserve units and the replacement carrier units of the military districts (documents 75-79).

Documents on the number of command personnel sent to the line units are interesting. Unfortunately, they encompass only the end of 1918 and 1919.

The fourth section characterizes the state of supply of the Red Army with armament, troop equipment, and food for the years 1918-1919. The documents which it contains reflect the work of the supply organs in finding and sending armaments and ammunition to the front (documents 117-121) and contain information on the availability, in the Red Army, of airplanes and aviation equipment (document 122) and of armament and ammunition at the warehouses of the Main Artillery Directorate, fronts, and armies.

Of considerable interest is the summary of the combat and numerical composition of enemy troops for May, July, September, November, and December 1918 (documents 162-167); for January, February, June, and August-November 1919 (documents 168-175); and for February, May, July-November 1920 (documents 176-185). They permit calculating the correlation of forces and weapons of the sides for these months and evaluating and presenting the conditions in which the operational-strategic plans of the Soviet command were worked out and implemented. But the value of the section would have been much greater if the compilers had compared summaries of the combat and numerical composition of the sides for the same time.

The sixth section includes information on the front, army, and division command personnel of the regular troops of the Eastern, Western, Caspian, Caucasian, Kalmyk-Caucasus, Northern, Northeastern, Semirechensk, Turkestan, Ukrainian, Fergana, Southeastern, Southwestern, and Southern Fronts and the troops of the Turkestan Republic.

The seventh section includes documents not contained in Volumes 1, 2, and 3 of the series. The last two sections include an index of the formations, large units and various other formations of the army and navy which are mentioned in the published directives of the front command and also a name index of all four volumes of front command directives and the volume of directives of the Main Command.

Evaluating highly the work performed by the compilers and the publishing house in preparing and publishing the documents of the volume under review and those preceding it, they cannot fail to be reproached for errors committed, the elimination of which is hardly possible now. First, the compilers and publishers did not notice the discrepancy between the page numbers in name index and the text of Volume 4. And this can undermine the reader's confidence in the other reference sections. Second, reporting the numbering of the large units and the names of their commanders in Volume 4, the compilers did not place these names in the name index. And finally, disclosing all formations and naming their commanders and the periods of their command, the compilers and publishers did not consider it possible to include data on the times when these formations joined the active army.

On the whole, the fourth volume of front-command directives is a valuable and needed collection. The work of a large collective of personnel in the Main Archives Administration with the Council of Ministers USSR, the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and the Central State Archives of the Soviet Army was greeted with great approval by Soviet and foreign specialists and the public. The materials of the published series are making an important contribution to the Soviet study of source materials and will become the basis for new basic research on the history of the Soviet Armed Forces and the origin and development of our military art.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Direktivy komandovaniya frontov Krasnoy Armii (1917-1922)" [Directives of Red Army Front Commands (1917-1922)]. A collection of documents in four volumes. Vol 4. Materials, indexes. Voenizdat, 1978; 728 pages.
2. Reviews of collections. "Directives of the Main Red Army Command (1917-1922)", "Directives of Red Army Front Commands," Vols I-III see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY Zhurnal, No 6, 1970, pp 80-85; No 7, 1972, pp 105-109; No 3, 1973, pp 112-117; No 8, 1975, pp 113-117.

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BOOK REVIEW: INTERNATIONAL ZIONISM

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[Book review by Candidate of Historical Sciences Colonel V. Karnoukhov: "Ideology and Practice of International Zionism"]

[Text] Under conditions of the aggravation of the ideological struggle by opposing social systems, the aggressive imperialist circles are counting on international Zionism. The monograph by a group of authors of the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences is devoted to a critical analysis of its basic concepts and the expansionist, chauvinistic policy of Israel's rulers.¹

The work attracted the great attention of our country's scientific community. And this is not by chance. It generalizes important material which exposes the subversive activity of international Zionism against the Soviet people which began immediately after the victory of the Great October. The Zionists are conducting it even now with special bitterness. The monograph makes a detailed analysis of the Near East alliance of imperialism and Zionism and discloses its anti-Soviet nature and the striving for the constant exertion of pressure on the explosively dangerous situation in the Near East which is fraught with the threat of the outbreak of a new world war.

The undoubted merits of the work under review include the high scientific level of the publication. It is written on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology with the broad use of numerous archive documents, the majority of which were put into scientific circulation for the first time. This permitted the authors to demonstrate convincingly the theoretical groundlessness as well as the politically reactionary character of Zionism.

The main theoretical postulate of Zionism is the idea of the "universal Jewish nation which is standing against all non-Jews" (p 39). The monograph shows convincingly the identity of this interpretation with the delirious dogma "of the chosen Aryan master race" which was propagated at one time by false Hitlerite theoreticians.

The newspaper AL-'ITTIHAD [as transliterated], the organ of the Israeli Communist Party's Central Committee, noted correctly on 23 July 1968: "Life itself has shown irrefutably that the Jewish communities of various countries belong nationally to those nations within which they are living. They have been completely integrated in them economically and politically. They live one social and cultural life with them.... There are absolutely no grounds to assert that the Soviet Jews and American Jews belong to the same nation because Soviet Jews are Soviet and nothing else in their culture, in their economic and social structure, political views, and upbringing. The Jews who live in America are Americans and are such in their culture and political, social, and economic structure" (p 41).

However, this viewpoint does not suit the Zionists. Repeating the canons of the Judaic religion, they are trying to prove that allegedly the Jews belong to "higher beings" which are preordained to rule over all other "lower beings."

Proceeding from the definition of Zionism as the "Jewish branch of imperialism" which was given by the 14th Israeli Communist Party Congress in 1961, the authors show that it is namely in the era of imperialism that Jewish monopoly capital, continuously building up its might, has seized positions in all spheres of activity of the leading capitalist powers and has persistently achieved the accomplishment of its global aggressive goals. They present data which show the tremendous power and influence of Zionist capital. Thus, in the United States alone by the middle of the 1970's it comprised 1.5 trillion dollars, which exceeded the gross national product of the world's main imperialist power (p 127). A similar situation is also observed in a number of other developed capitalist states of the West.

Events of recent years have revealed with special force the class essence of international Zionism, its place in the world imperialist system, and the tremendous possibilities and scales of subversive activity against the forces of peace, socialism, and progress.

For a long period of time, the political doctrine of Zionism was covered by the false slogan of searches for the solution of the "Jewish question" which allegedly gave rise to the "movement of world Jewry" for the creation of a "national homeland for Jews" in Palestine, and then of a Jewish state on this territory and the "defense of its interests." Such a state was created in 1948. It appeared that at least for a while Zionism should have curtailed its ideological, political, and military expansion. Actually, everything was and is different. Zionist forces developed global activity, forming the extreme right flank of world imperialist reaction. The official representatives of Israel do not hide the true intentions of international Zionism in their statements, either. Thus, the first head of the Israeli government, Ben-Gurion, declared with cynical frankness on the very first day of his premiership: "The emergence of Israel is not the end of our struggle. Today we have only begun it. We must continue it to achieve and create a state from the Nile to the Euphrates, for the sake of which we have already applied so much effort" (p 133).

Secret documents of the Israeli Armed Forces General Staff were published in Bombay, India, in November 1957. They disclosed plans for the creation of a vast Israeli Zionist state with the support of the imperialists. In a document under the title "Strategic Plan of the Israeli Army for 1956-1957" which was drawn up even before the start of the Suez adventure, the Israeli General Staff substantiated the "necessity" to conduct a preventive war against the Arab states to change "the general situation in the Near East." The plan presented a list of tremendous territories which, according to the intentions of Tel-Aviv, were to be joined to Israel, and ways and methods to split and and crush the Arab world were also determined. This, in essence, was the plan for the creation of a "great" Zionist power dominating the Near East (p 138).

The book points out the causes and successively traces the course and outcome of all Arab-Israeli wars in the Near East. Here, the authors stress that Israel's aggressive actions became possible only as a result of world imperialism's direct assistance to her and, primarily, that of the United States of America. As regards the Soviet Union, it undertook and is undertaking all political and other measures which depend on her for peace in the Near East to become really strong for all states of the region (p 148).

The book analyzes Israel's aggressive policy toward Lebanon where Palestinians who were driven by Israel from the lands which belonged to them from time immemorial found refuge (pp 150, 151). The Israeli militarists are employing a "scorched earth" policy here in trying to frighten the Lebanese and physically destroy the Palestinians.

An important place is devoted to the exposure of Israel's ties with the United States of America. The book correctly points out that through the efforts of the United States and all the forces of international Zionism Israel was transformed into the most militaristic state in the world. Not even the Israeli leaders themselves conceal this. Thus, while he was still prime minister Rabin stated without a shadow of embarrassment: "The support given to Israel by the government of the United States in the international arena, in the deliveries of armaments, and in the sphere of economic assistance has no precedent in essence. The difference between what we want and what we receive is extremely insignificant" (p 160).

Thanks to the "concerns" of Uncle Sam, Israel has occupied first place in the world for per capita military expenditures. They comprise \$470-\$490 per person, that is, 51 percent of its annual budget. Chauvinism and racism and an attitude of mass military psychosis are cultivated within the country. The rulers of Israel do not hide the fact that at the necessary moment they will proceed to place nuclear weapons at the service of their interests.² It is not by chance that Israel is among the few countries which thus far have refused to sign the treaty of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (p 161).

The book under review provides reasoned criticism of the Zionists who are trying to lead citizens of Jewish origin out from under the jurisdiction

of their native state and subordinate them to some extra-state or even "superstate" organ (p 185). This presumes not only financial support, but also absolute readiness to satisfy any Israeli demand and an active struggle for Israel's political interests even if such a struggle contradicts the interests of the country where the Jews live (p 196).

As the member of the Central Committee Politburo of the Israeli Communist Party, E. Tuma, stated in this regard, "This impudent appeal requires of the Jews, wherever they may be, that they identify themselves with the course of aggression and expansion which the ruling circles of Israel are conducting."³

Using numerous facts, the book shows that anticommunism and anti-Sovietism are the official line of Israeli foreign policy.⁴ In 1964, the Zionists were made responsible for exerting constant pressure on Soviet institutions everywhere.⁵

At the beginning of 1969, the international Zionist concern adopted the decision to declare a "war of nerves" on the Soviet Union and a year later the prime minister of Israel, Golda Meir, declared international Zionism's "all-out campaign" against the Soviet Union (p 227).

International Zionism is appropriating billions of dollars for the preparation and conduct of subversive operations against the USSR and the other peace-loving socialist states. Suffice it to say that the budget of the World Zionist Organization alone, the headquarters and main centers of which are located in the United States and Israel, reaches 700-800 million dollars annually (p 236).

The facts which have been presented show that Zionism is the enemy of peace-loving peoples and one of the constant sources of the danger of war in the world, and the aggressive, expansionist policy of Israel is the center of tension in the Near East. Tel-Aviv has raised acts of aggression and terrorism to the rank of state policy. It is not even stopped by the danger of transforming a local conflict in the Near East into a new world war.

The concluding chapter shows the struggle of Israel's Communist Party against Zionism and for democracy, peace, and socialism. It discloses the bravery of Israel's communists who are opposing the militaristic and chauvinistic course of the Zionists under the most difficult conditions. They believe that the "struggle against the ideology and practice of Zionism is an act of Israeli patriotism."⁶

However, the book under review is not devoid of shortcomings, either. The most substantial of them is that in criticizing international Zionism, the authors made far from complete use of documents of the CPSU and the fraternal communist and workers parties. Materials of the Comintern congresses and international and regional conferences of communist and workers parties were poorly used.

There is some carelessness in the formulations. This also pertains, in particular, to the definition of Zionism which is repeated many times, but each time differently. Repetitions not only of individual thoughts, but also of quotations occur in a number of chapters, especially in Chapters 7 and 12.

Some statements by bourgeois correspondents, for example, about "Soviet advisers" in the Egyptian army (p 155) need the appropriate explanations; otherwise, they may create an incorrect impression of the role of our assistance to the countries which have been liberated from colonial dependence.

It is also difficult to agree with the characterization of the political and diplomatic game of Washington and Tel-Aviv as "unprincipled" (p 149). Here, one should rather see the deeply thought-out, insidious policy conducted by the United States and Israel to deceive world public opinion and directed toward strengthening the positions of imperialism and Zionism in the Far East.

The evaluation of events connected with the perfidious policy of President Anwar Sadat who has concluded a separate agreement with Israel (p 156) is not quite correct. However, the noted shortcomings do not detract from the great scientific and practical value of the work being reviewed.

Soviet and foreign readers have received a valuable aid which is furthering the intensification of ideological and political-indoctrinational work in the Armed Forces and the struggle against international Zionism which is a threat to the peace and security of the peoples.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Ideologiya i praktika mezhdunarodnogo sionizma. Kriticheskiy analiz" [The Ideology and Practice of International Zionism. A Critical Analysis]. Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, 271 pages
2. PRAVDA, 3 March 1978.
3. NOVOYE VREMYA, No 51, 1970, p 25.
4. "XVII s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Izrailiya" [Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of Israel], p 26.
5. Yuriy Ivanov, "Ostorozhno: sionizm!" [Caution: Zionism!], p 156.
6. "XVII s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Izrailiya," pp 175-176.

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BOOK REVIEW: WARFARE IN KENYA 1952-1958

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 79 signed to press 23 Nov 79 pp 68-69

[Book review by Doctor of Historical Sciences O. Rzheshevskiy: "Book on Warfare in Africa"]

[Text] The Nauka Publishing House has published an interesting monograph by A. M. Pegushev* which is devoted to the armed uprising of the Kenya people in 1952-1956. Using numerous archive materials, memoirs of participants in the uprising, and other sources, the author analyzed the problem of the African people's struggle against colonial oppression and subjected to criticism the bourgeois falsifiers of history who are trying to distort and belittle the significance of this uprising and its effect on making more active the armed conflict for the liberation of other countries on the African continent.

The Kenyan political parties and public organizations (Kenya African Union and others) tried to obtain economic and political concessions from the colonizers by legal means but were unsuccessful. Under conditions of intensified colonial exploitation, racial oppression, and repression, an underground anticolonial movement, "For Land and Freedom," which gained fame as the Mau Mau movement, arose in Kenya in 1947. In the beginning, it was the bearer of an elemental peasant ideology. When it was joined by the city strata of the population, primarily by the working class and the city's lower strata, it assumed a different direction.

An important role in this movement belonged to participants in World War II who had fought as part of the antifascist coalition. They also brought truthful news about the Soviet Union whose heroic people had freed themselves from the chains of capital in 1917, played the decisive role in the destruction of fascism, and rendered and is rendering great moral and material assistance to the national-liberation movement of the peoples of all

* A. M. Pegushev, "Povstaniye Mau Mau (Istoriya antikolonial'nogo vooruzhennogo vosstaniya 1952-1956 gg. v Kenii)" [Mau Mau Insurgents (History of the Anticolonial Armed Uprising in 1952-1956 in Kenya)]. Moscow, Nauka 1978, 355 pages.

continents in the postwar period. These facts amazed the world outlook of Kenyan communal peasants and hired hands, the majority of whom were illiterate. They began to ponder over the reasons for the lack of their political and economic rights and the future of their homeland. The country's political and trade union leaders with radical sentiments formed the basis of the movement's leadership and its Central Committee.

Disclosing in detail the tactics of "Mau Mau direct action" (the physical elimination of spies, traitors, and active opponents, the collection of resources and weapons, the formation of the first groups of forest fighters), the author notes that at first the leaders of the movement did not have a plan for the uprising and were not prepared for prolonged armed conflict. They were oriented on "knocking out" concessions from the British authorities whose mass repressions against the people, progressive parties, trade unions, and leaders of the "Kenya African Union" led to armed conflict throughout the entire country. However, a detailed plan for the leadership of the insurrectionary war was worked out later with consideration of the political and military experience of the participants in World War II who had fought in Burma, North Africa, and the Near East. For its implementation, numerous local groups of insurgents were created which conducted combat operations in the mountain regions of central Kenya. One of the main tasks of the city organizations was supplying the forest fighters with weapons, ammunition, and medicines. Gradually, the entire leadership of the uprising also moved from Nairobi to the forest regions of Kenya. In 1953, combat detachments of insurgents, underground organizations, and Mau Mau groups were combined into the "Army of Land and Freedom" headed by Dedan Kimathi (as transliterated)--a talented political and military organizer of armed resistance. The organizational measures which were conducted in the young army (introduction of military ranks, development of "Rules of Behavior in the Forest," the organization of a network of permanent and temporary bases, centralized manufacture and repair of weapons, and so forth) led the struggle of the Kenya peoples against the British colonizers into a more reliable channel. It was concluded with the complete victory of the insurgents despite the tremendous military-technical superiority of the colonizers and the subversive activity of British intelligence.

The monograph being reviewed testifies once again to the illusoriness of the assertions of imperialist propaganda concerning the voluntary departure of the colonizers from Africa. "...The Mau Mau uprising," writes A. A. Pegushev, "objectively had a Kenya-wide and Africa-wide significance. The struggle of the Mau Mau insurgents was the first serious attempt at an organized armed movement against Britain's colonial domination on this continent. It influenced the development of the national-liberation movement in several other countries of the continent..." (p 305). The significance of this uprising was also determined by the fact that it was initiated in a country which was considered to be Britain's key military-strategic point in the eastern and central parts of Africa.

The book's author has made an important contribution to the study of the timely problem of the history of the armed liberation struggle by the peoples

of the African continent. But the monograph would have been even more effective if proper attention had been paid in it to the illumination of the military aspects of the uprising's course and the analysis of its results. The description should have been supplemented with a map or diagram of the combat operations in Kenya. It is believed that reference to the published works of Soviet historians on this question cannot satisfy the readers completely.

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EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF SIBERIA DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 79 signed to press 23 Nov 79 pp 72-76

[Article by Capt 1st Rank (Res) M. Filimoshin: "Chronicle of the Development of Siberia and the Far East"; continuation of an article begun in VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 7, 1979]

[Text] At the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries almost all Western Siberia became part of the Russian state. During this time, a large number of populated places appeared there, many of which became administrative centers of the uyezds which were formed (Berezovskiy, Verkhotur'skiy, Ketskij, Kuznetskiy, Mangazey'skiy, Ilyumskiy, Pelymskiy, Surgutskiy, Tarskiy, Tobol'skiy, Tomskiy, Turinskij, Tyumenskij).

The places for the settlements were selected by explorers and town businessmen, as a rule along river banks with consideration of political, administrative-economic, geographic, and military factors. In the majority of cases, this selection was good and successfully withstood the test of time.

It should be kept in mind that the Siberian cities arose initially as military fortified posts. Their basic military-administrative functions at that time were the collection of tribute and the protection of the new lands, which had become part of the Russian state, against "hostile neighbors" and warlike nomadic tribes. Subsequently, they were transformed into centers of handicrafts and trade. Altogether, from the moment of the founding of the first city in Siberia (Tyumen', 1586) up to 1700 140-150 cities, stockades, and palisades were built on the territory beyond the Urals¹, primarily wooden ("log"). Stone structures began to be erected only at the end of the 18th century when it was ordered that all public buildings be built of stone (to combat fires).

The basic mass of the military class in the Siberian towns and fortified posts consisted of mounted and dismounted Cossacks (including "newly baptized" local residents) as well as serving Tatars and military "technicians" (marksmen, gunners, and sappers and others). Because of the sparseness of

the population the majority of the Siberian garrisons experienced a chronic shortage of men at that time. Therefore, from the very beginning the contingent of Russian troops here was insignificant. By 1662, only 13,000 military people (Cossacks, marksmen, and so forth) were located in the Transurals (from "Kamen'" to the Sea of Okhotsk (together with retirees)).²

Each uezd Siberian town was headed by a military governor who was appointed by the government and who had complete authority on the territory under his jurisdiction. He was also chief of the local garrison.

Creating the military-administrative centers and uezds, the Moscow government at the same time preserved the internal organization of the aborigine peoples and relied on it in the course of annexing and securing the new lands. It should be noted that the indigenous Siberian population at that time was in various stages of the disintegration of the primitive-communal society. And only part of the Western Siberian Tatars, who had settled the lands along the Tobol and Sredniy Irtysh, had their own state organization by the time of the Russians' arrival--the Siberian khanate which arose in the 1620's in the period of Golden Horde which had begun to collapse. The simultaneous existence of closely interwoven feudal and tribal relations as well as a continuous intestine struggle for the expansion of nomad village lands was typical of it. After the first victory of Yermak's Cossack troops over the main forces of the Khanate (1582) it actually collapsed.

Peasant villages and hamlets grew up on Siberian land along with administrative centers and security fortifications. According to data from a census in the 1680's there were 49 hamlets in the jurisdiction of Nev'yansk large village of Verkhoturaskiy uezd and 22 in Armashevskaya large village. The census of 1710 showed that in Tobol'skiy uezd alone there were 58 large villages with numerous hamlets adjoining them. According to incomplete data, 41,437 males resided in the indicated populated places, of them 29,423 peasants.³ Thus, already in the 17th century farmers had become the basis of the developing productive forces of Siberia. "The Russian peasant with wooden plow, harrow, and sickle and with his agricultural skills accomplished a genuine revolution in available forms and degree in the matter of utilizing the land wealth of Siberia."^{3a}

To strengthen the organs of state authority in Siberia, the government decided to form a main administrative center there which, from 1590, became Tobol'sk. This marked the beginning of the new system of control and the oblast administrative division (razryad). The Tobol'skiy razryad, which included all the other towns of the Transurals, was finally formed by 1608.

With the formation of the Tomskiy razryad in 1629, the Lenskiy in 1639, and the Yeniseyskiy in the 1670's, they included towns which gravitated toward the indicated regions. Despite the break-ups into small units which were conducted, Tobol'sk remained the first city of Siberia and its political, administrative-economic, and cultural center. It continued to dominate its own uezd as well as razryad towns until 1796.




Diagram of Most Important Routes to Western
Siberia in the 15th-16th Centuries

The basic task of the main Tobol'sk administrator (military governor) was overall direction of the organization and operation of the outlying Siberian districts. He was also assigned the duty to "look for profits for the state in any incomes in all Siberian towns of the Tobol'sk razryad" and to be concerned "that Siberian land expanded and did not become deserted."

The Tobol'sk military governor was the commander of the Siberian military forces and was responsible to the tsarist government for the security of the entire territory. He was to adopt measures to annex to Russia the new lands discovered by Russian explorers, but by peaceful means rather than by force of arms. "The military governors were told in writing," it said in the instructions from Moscow, "that they should not bring unpeaceful settlers under the sovereign's eminent hand with brutality, but with kindness."^{3b}

The annexation of Siberia was not only a political act. The economic development of the territory had primary significance here. The principal moving forces in this grandiose historic process were: /the broad popular masses/ [in boldface] and, first of all, the Russian peasants, artisans, working people, and pioneer-explorers; /the trade and commercial employers;

the Russian state/[in boldface] which secured the newly discovered lands, ensured their security, and established a system of centralized control for the indigenous residents as well as for the newly-arrived population.

1593--On instructions from Moscow a detachment of military governor N. V. Trakhaniotov reinforced by state servants set off downstream on the Irtysh and Ob' in boats in the summer to build a Russian administrative center on territory which had been settled by Ob' Khants and which formerly had been called Yugorskaya Zemlya. The new town (Berezon) was constructed by the end of the year on the bank of the Severnaya Sos'va 20 kilometers from where it empties into the Ob'. The ancient route from Run' to the Ob' region passed through here (Zyryanaskaya road or Russkiy tes).

1594--Ten immigrants led by the foreman Timofey Yevtyugin from Ustyug and Perm' Velikaya arrived at the new small Siberian town of Pelym at their own desire. They all expressed the desire to serve as marksmen here.

--An expeditionary detachment of Cossacks and local Siberian residents numbering more than 1,500 men (including 20 carpenters) under the command of A. V. Yeletskiy built a new strong point on the Irtysh at the point where the Tara River empties into it--the small town of Tara--to repel the raids of Khan Kuchum's hordes and the steppe nomads.

The permanent garrison of the town of Tara at that time consisted of 320 Cossacks who performed military-security service in the region bordering with the steppe. The Tara military governor was instructed: "before having recourse...to arms" against Kuchum, "try to influence the khan with kindness and friendly persuasion" so that they stop the struggle against Russia and accept Russian citizenship.

--In February, a small group of state servants led by military governors F.P. Baryatinskiy and V. Anichkov was dispatched to Siberia from Moscow to consolidate the lands of the Ob' region above the mouth of the Irtysh as part of Russia. In the small town of Obskiy they joined up with a party of Berezov state servants and Kodskoye Khants^b which had been sent by the Berezov military governor, N. V. Trakhaniotov. The combined detachment set off up the Ob' to the domains of the Khant princeling Bardak who had accepted Russian citizenship voluntarily. The fortress of Surgut, which became a strong point of the Russian state in the Ob' region and the center of Surgutskiy uезд, was built with his help on the right bank of the Ob' (in the center of the "principality").

1595--The small town of Obdorsk (now the city of Salekhard), the northernmost point of the Russian state in Western Siberia, was founded at the winter hut site of the Russian manufacturers (the lower reaches of the Ob').

1596--Surgut state servants, under the leadership of the Cossack ataman Tugar'nik Fedorov constructed the Narymskiy stockade to prevent the military alliance of the local Sel'kup tribes ("Mottled Horde") with Kuchum who had migrated here with the intention of accomplishing a raid on Surgutskiy uезд.

--In Tobol'sk, Tyumen', and Pelym skilled workmen sent from Moscow began to build the first flour mills (water and wind).

1597--On the suggestion of the Sol'-Vychegodsk townsman Artemiy Babinov the construction of a new land road to Siberia was begun (south of the old route which went through the small town of Loz'vinskiy). It was laid out from Solikamsk through the mountain passes to the upper reaches of the Tura River and was shorter than the former route by 1,000 versts, that is, it was half as long. For finding the new road, the talented explorer Artemiy Babinov received an estate (patrimony) as a reward.

--The Tara military governors who, on instructions of the government, entered into talks with Kuchum, sent him a letter from the tsar with the suggestion that he cease military operations against Russia and recognize the authority of the Moscow tsar. In return, it was promised to assign to him nomad territories along the Irtysh. However, the talks did not provide favorable results. It was soon learned that Kuchum was preparing for a raid on Russian settlements, hoping to receive military assistance from the Nogayskiy hordes and the Bukhara khanate. After this, instructions were received from Moscow to organize a military campaign against Kuchum's hordes.

1598--In August, a detachment under the command of Andrey Voyekov and created from Russian and Tatar state servants (from Tara, Tobol'sk, and Tyumen') set out for the campaign against Kuchum. After a number of military clashes his headquarters was smashed and the members of the khan family were taken prisoner. Kuchum succeeded in fleeing with a small group of soldiers. Further information about him has a contradictory nature. In some sources, it states that Kuchum drowned in the Ob', in others--that he was killed by the Bukharites, and in still others it is reported that after a clash with the Kalmuck Tayshas on the Irtysh Kuchum fled with "a few people to the land where the Nogayskiy live" and where he was killed.

--The small town of Verkhotur'ye was built in the upper reaches of the Tura River (on the line of the new Siberian road). Participating in its erection under the direction of military governor V. P. Golovina were the residents of the small town of Loz'vinskiy (carpenters, peasants, marksmen) who were transferred here for permanent residence. Verkhotur'ye was "the main gate to Siberia" for the entire 17th century.

--Fedor D'yakov with two assistants was sent to Siberia from Moscow "to investigate Mangazeya localities right up to the Yenisey River...." He returned to Moscow in 1600. His route is unknown.

1600--To ensure shipments of cargoes from Verkhotur'ye to Tyumen', Turinsk stockade was founded on the Tura River (Turinsk) which was also intended for protection of the populated places of the local residents and Russian immigrants against the raids of the Nogayskiy and other nomads. Fifty state servants arrived in Turinsk with the Tyumen' mayor for permanent residence in Turinsk. The government moved 55 peasant families and 6 waggoner families here from Kazan'.

--A detachment of state servants numbering 1,500 people headed by the military governors Prince Miron Shakhovskiy and Danila Khripunov set out from

Tobol'sk along the Ob' to the mouth of the Taz to extend state authority to the vast region between the Gulf of Ob' and the lower course of the Yenisey. The travellers were wrecked in the Gulf of Ob' (some of the vessels and provisions were lost). When moving over the land route, the detachment was attacked by Samodiy'skiy tribes and suffered considerable losses. Only a part of the detachment reached the Taz River.

--The first arcade in Siberia was built in Verkhotur'ye for trade. Here "it was ordered that a custom house be established to collect duties from the importing and exporting of merchants' goods."

1601--State servants headed by the military governor M. Shakhovskiy founded the town of Mangazeya on the Taz River between its tributaries--the Ob' and Rapolikha Rivers. It became a local administrative center and the most important commercial and transshipment point. Until approximately the 1630's up to 1,000 manufacturers who had prepared for the next business season and comprised the overwhelming part of the Russian population spent the winter in Mangazeya each year. A permanent garrison (100 state servants) was formed there in 1625. In 1672, the town ceased to exist because of the impoverishment of the hunting grounds adjoining it. Its trade and industrial functions moved to Turukhansk ("New Mangazeya" on the Yenisey).

1601-1602--A large group of Russian commercial people (40) headed by Levka Ivanov Shubin (Plekhan) left the Severnaya Dvina in 1601 on four sailboats by the "large Okian Sea" for the East, to Mangazeya. Because of bad weather and misfortunes which befell them, they were forced to enter the Pechora and winter in Pustozersk. The next year, 1602, the Russian manufacturers continued their trip and, bypassing the Yugorskiy Shar strait, they reached the mouth of the Mutnaya River (Yamal Peninsula). Moving up to its upper reaches, they dragged their boats and cargoes by portage to the Zelenaya River over which they dropped to the Ob' and then reached Mangazeya by the Taz River. Merchants and industrialists used this sea route until the beginning of the 1620's. In 1620, it was closed by an ukaze from Moscow to block Siberia from the penetration of businessmen and colonizers there from the West European countries.

1602--The Ket' stockade was built on the Ket' Tiver (right tributary of the Ob').

1604--The decision to build the city of Tomsk was made in March. It was basically completed in September. It was erected by an expeditionary detachment under the command of G. I. Pisemskiy and V. F. Tyrkov which was formed in Surgut of Tobol'sk and Tyumen' Cossacks, Pelym marksmen, Tobol'sk Tatars, and Kodskeye Khants.

The construction of the new city was preceded by the request of the local (Eshutinsk) Prince Toyon who appealed to the government of Boris Gudonov to take the villages of the Tomsk Tatars in the Nizhnee Pritom'ye under protection and to establish a Russian fortress on their lands.

At the beginning of the 17th century, Tomsk was the easternmost city of the Moscow state. Russian peasants and artisans began to arrive here behind the military people just as in other Siberian cities. This year the city of Tomsk, which has become a big Siberian industrial and scientific center during the time of Soviet authority, marked its 375th anniversary.

FOOTNOTES

1. Calculated by P. P. Yepifanov, professor and doctor of historical sciences.
2. P. A. Slovtsov, "Istoricheskoye obozreniye Sibiri" [Historical Survey of Siberia], St. Petersburg, 1886, pp 180-181.
3. V. I. Shunkov, "Ocherki po istorii kolonizatsii Sibiri v XVII-nachale XVIII vekov" [Essays on the History of Siberia's Colonization in the 17th and Beginning of the 18th Centuries], Moscow-Leningrad, Izd. AN SSSR, 1946, p 45.
- 3a. V. I. Shunkov, "Ocherki po istorii zemledeliya Sibiri. XVII vek" [Essays on the History of Siberian Agriculture. 17th Century], Izd. AN SSSR, 1956, p 8.
- 3b. S. V. Bakhrushin, "Nauchnyye trudy" [Scientific Works], Part I, Moscow, Izd. AN SSSR, 1955, p 255.
4. The "Kodskoye principality", located on the banks of the Ob' (north of the Kondy River) was the biggest of all the Khant principalities with which the Russian state maintained ties long before the annexation of Siberia. It became part of Russia in 1558; however, the local princely dynasty maintained its authority and its succession until 1643. The Russian government used the force and influence of the Kodskoye princes to subdue the Ostyatskiy and Yugorskiy tribes adjacent to them. The Kodskoye Khants took part in many campaigns of the military governors to the east as well as in the building of towns (Berezov, Surgut, the city of Tomsk, Makovskiy and Yenisey stockades, and others). The size of the detachments of the Kodskoye Khants which were detailed to assist the Russian explorers reached 150-200 men.
5. This area was known as Mangazeya to the Russians from the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th centuries. It has also been established by scientific investigations that Russian people "from the Pinega, from the Mezen', and from the Dvina" were actively engaged in the fur industry here and in trade with the local residents from the middle of the 16th century. They reached there primarily by the sea route. The traders and merchants built small towns (winter huts) for themselves in many places, including on the banks of the Taz River.

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LENIN MILITARY-POLITICAL ACADEMY: ANNIVERSARY MARKED

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[Article by deputy chief of the academy, Professor and Doctor of Historical Sciences Lt Gen Ye. Nikitin: "The V. I. Lenin Military-Political Academy Is 60 Years Old"]

[Text] The glorious history of the Military-Political Orders of Lenin and the October Revolution, Red Banner Academy imeni V. I. Lenin marks its beginning from the Teachers Institute of the Red Army which was created in Petrograd at the end of 1919. It was awarded the name of military commissar N. G. Tolmachev who died heroically in the battles against the Yudenich forces.

The first graduation of 134 students of the institute took place as early as March 1920. On the fronts of the Civil War, they showed themselves to be brave and skillful organizers of political work, possessing initiative, and boundlessly devoted to the revolution and the Soviet motherland.

This educational institution underwent a number of transformations in subsequent years. In 1923, it bore the name of Military-Political Institute, and on 14 May 1925, on the instruction of the TsK VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] and by order of the Republic's Revolutionary Military Council signed by M. V. Frunze it was converted into the Military-Political Academy. The Party assigned it the mission of training political personnel with a higher military-political education. Its structure, and forms and methods for the instruction and indoctrination of the students were improved under the direct leadership of the TsK VKP(b). In the summer of 1937, a political section was created in the academy which played an important role in improving training-indoctrinational work.

A new, exciting event in the life of the academy took place in January 1938. On the decision of the TsK VKP(b), it was awarded the name of the great Lenin and it was moved to Moscow. At all stages of the Soviet Armed Forces' organizational development the communists of the VPA [Military-Political Academy] were the reliable support of the Central Committee in the unswerving implementation of its policy. They displayed ideological and political

maturity in the Party's struggle with the Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, and other oppositionists and representatives of anti-Lenin trends. Students and teachers of the academy took an active part in combat operations of Red Army units in the area of Lake Khasan, the Khalkhin-Gol River, and in the liberation campaigns in the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. In the period of the Soviet-Finnish conflict in 1939-1940, the academy sent 162 students to the front. They were worthy examples of bravery and heroism in the battles for the motherland. Seventy-six of them were awarded orders and medals and Senior Political Instructor V. R. Boyko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The Military-Political Academy met the Great Patriotic War with a combat, merried collective. During the years of the struggle with the German-fascist aggressors the VPA gave the front about 13,000 brave party fighters.*

Alumni of the academy, multiplying the heroic achievements of the Civil War commissars, inscribed brilliant and unforgettable pages in the combat chronicle of the Soviet Armed Forces. They—from the political instructor to the member of the military council—were on all fronts and were located where it was most difficult of all, strengthening faith in the triumph of our just cause in the fighting men and instilling in them bravery, will, and fearlessness.

The last salvoes of the war thundered away. As a result of the basically qualitative shifts in the country's domestic and international life, at the new stage of military organizational development under conditions of the scientific and technical revolution and important changes in military affairs new tasks were also put forth in training cadres of political officers. To supplement the former faculties, the military-justice and military-pedagogical faculties were also created. Correspondence instruction and post-graduate work were expanded. Theoretically trained officers and generals with combat experience poured into the professorial and teaching collective. New forms of lessons began to be broadly introduced into the training-indoctrinational process. In a short time, the academy was transformed into a multiprofile higher military-political educational institution. The new stage in the development of the Armed Forces and the contemporary party requirements for the higher Soviet school, including the military school, made it necessary to look for more effective forms and methods of training-indoctrinational work. The combat program of activity for the academy was the decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 21 January 1967, "On measures to improve party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces."

From 1974, the academy changed over to new plans and programs of instruction which envision a higher level of professional training of cadres of political officers for all the services of the Armed Forces and combat arms.

* "Na strazhe zavoyevaniy Velikogo Oktyabrya" [Guarding the Achievements of the Great October], Moscow, Izd. VPA, 1977, p. 24.

Training in the correspondence faculty of the academy is acquiring ever greater popularity among the troops. Courses for retraining and improving supervisory personnel as well as courses to increase the qualifications of teachers of social sciences of military-educational institutions have been functioning for more than 10 years with the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin.

The lines of the 25th CPSU Congress as well as the requirements of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "On further improvement in ideological and political-indoctrinational work," has had an exceptionally beneficial influence on the academy's activity. These leading and directing documents are furthering the enrichment of the lessons' ideological-theoretical content and making the entire life of the academy more active.

V. I. Lenin taught that in any school the most important thing is the ideological-political direction of the lectures, which is determined entirely and exclusively by the **/staff of lecturers/** [in boldface]. The command and political section of the academy as well as the departments are doing everything to raise the professional level of the instructors higher. Now about 60 percent of their staff have scientific degrees and titles. And this indicator is rising above 80 percent in the social disciplines departments.

The academy is proud of such teachers as V. G. Bazhenov, V. I. Varin, K. A. Vorob'yev, A. M. Galkin, A. Ya. Demkov, N. G. Didenko, A. P. Dmitriyev, V. T. Yevdokimov, V. P. Izmaylov, P. M. Malyavin, V. P. Matveyev, M. Ye. Monin, V. M. Puzik, P. I. Romanov, Ye. N. Sevast'yanov, P. V. Sokolov, N. V. Stepanov, N. F. Fedenko, and many others.

The VPA is not only a higher educational situation. It is an important scientific center of the Soviet Armed Forces. Five specialized scientific councils are functioning in it: on historical, philosophical, psychological-pedagogical, and economic sciences. During the last decade alone about 800 candidate and doctorate dissertations have been defended in the academy, and more than 900 scientific works have been published including 500 monographs and 17 textbooks. More than 60 scientific works of the academy have been translated into 10 foreign languages. Widely known are such works as "Partiya i Armiya" [The Party and the Army], "V. I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily" [V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces], "KPSS i stroitel'stvo Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil" [The CPSU and the Organizational Development of the Soviet Armed Forces], "KPSS--organizator zashchity sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva" [The CPSU--Organizer of the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland], "Filosofskoye naslediyе V. I. Lenina i problemy sovremennoy voyny" [The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War], "Sodruzhestvo, rozhdennoye v boyakh" [Collaboration Born in Battles], "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya i vneshnyaya politika SSSR" [International Relations and the Foreign Policy of the USSR], the textbook "Nauchnyy kommunizm" [Scientific Communism], and others.

* V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 47, p 194.

The collective of VPA scientists is now accomplishing the tasks assigned by the 25th CPSU Congress in working out the basic problems which are connected with strengthening the combat might of the Armed Forces and increasing the effectiveness and quality of the men's instruction and indoctrination.

The military-scientific work of the students is acquiring ever more significance in scientific research activity. More than 70 percent of them are involved in scientific study groups (there are about 60 of them in the VPA).

Loyal to the academy's traditions, the students are actively participating in propaganda work. They are carrying the living party word to the masses of workers and servicemen not only in the capital, but also far beyond its limits. During the first two years after the 25th CPSU Congress alone, they have to their credit more than 15,000 presentations on the urgent problems of contemporaneity.

The Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin is accomplishing its international duty in a worthy manner. Officers from the fraternal armies are being trained together with Soviet students. The academy's contribution to the training of cadres of political officers for them is highly evaluated by the Marxist-Leninist parties and governments of the socialist states. The VPA has been awarded orders of Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Mongolia. It has firm and friendly ties with the military-educational institutions of the Warsaw Pact countries and assists them.

In surveying the path covered by the academy, it should be stressed that it owes all its successes to the wise leadership of the Party, its Leninist Central Committee, and their constant attention. The academy feels the daily fatherly concern of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR, and Chairman of the Defense Council, Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade L. I. Brezhnev.

The VPA receives daily assistance and support on the part of the Minister of Defense and chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces and local party organs. During the time of its existence, it has become the recognized forge of cadres of political personnel for the Armed Forces. Many alumni have developed into important political leaders. Among them are A. I. Bukov, S. A. Bobylev, A. P. Vasyagin, L. P. Vakhrushev, V. I. Frishanov, P. A. Gorchakov, I. S. Mednikov, N. V. Savinkin, M. G. Sobolev, A. I. Sorokin, G. V. Sredin, and many others. Almost all members of the military councils of districts, groups of forces, and fleets are VPA alumni. Its graduates can now be met in each large unit and in the overwhelming majority of the units.

The academy's collective is proud that our educational institution bears the radiant name of Vladimir Il'ich. It is a great honor. But the responsibility is even greater. The professorial and teaching staff, students, and VPA graduates compare each of their steps of practical activity with V. I. Lenin and carry his immortal ideas to the masses of servicemen.

Highly qualified political officers have been leaving the walls of the famous forge of personnel for a great life for six decades already. Together with commanders and all personnel, they are called upon to strengthen the combat might of the Armed Forces and reliably guard the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people.

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